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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

AMAX MAGNESIUM CORPORATION,
Petitioner/Plaintiff,
v.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

No. 88-0251

Respondent/Defendant.

Priority 14a

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Invoking three "fundamental rule[s] of statutory
construction", i.e., (1) that a "statute should be construed as
a comprehensive whole" (2) in "accord with usually accepted
meanings" and (3) under the assumption "that each term in the
statute [is] used advisedly" (Brief of Respondent/Defendant at
6-7; hereafter cited as "Resp. Br." (quoting Utah County v.
Orem City, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985))), the Utah State Tax
Commission asserts that Amax's opening brief (hereafter "Pet.
Br.") misconstrues the plain language of Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-5-3 (1953 & Supp. 1986). l According to the Commission,
Amax's property is "appurtenant" to the Great Salt Lake within

1/

Both parties agree that since the tax year in question is
1986, the statutes in effect as of January 1, 1986 are
controlling for purposes of this appeal. Pet. Br. at 1,
n.l; Resp. Br. at 1, n.l. Unless otherwise indicated all
citations hereafter to sections of the Utah Code are to
Utah Code Ann. (1953 & Supp 1986).
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the meaning of § 59-5-3 because —

even though Amax's property

"cannot pass as 'appurtenances' (as that term [is] ordinarily
understood in real estate)" (Resp. Br. 8) —
"appurtenant" should mean "adjacent."

Id.

the statutory term
The Commission

further declares that the legislative classification of Amax's
property as "centrally assessed" is sufficient justification
in and of itself —

—

to withhold from Amax the benefit of Utah

Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5. Notwithstanding a constitutionally
mandated "uniform and equal rate of assessment on all tangible
property in the state" (Utah Const, art. XIII, § 3(1)), the
Commission submits that Amax may be denied the 2 0% discount
embodied in § 59-5-4.5 because "the legislature has plenary
power in making such distinctions."

Resp. Br. 23. These

startling submissions simply do not withstand scrutiny.
As an initial matter, the three "fundamental rule[s] of
statutory construction" raised by the Commission (Resp. Br. 67) are carefully applied in Amax's opening brief.2

The

Commission, by contrast, strains these rules to the breaking
point in the course of reaching a predetermined interpretation
of § 59-5-3.

Far from relying upon the commonly accepted

meaning of the terms in § 59-5-3, the Commission shuffles
through various alleged synonyms for "appurtenant" to support
the submission that "appurtenant" should not be construed as it

2/

Compare, for example, the Commission's statement of its
three rules with the discussions appearing in Amax's
opening brief at pages 28 (particularly footnote 29), 18,
and 32, respectively.
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is "ordinarily understood in real estate."

Resp. Br. 8.

Moreover, rather than construing the statute as a comprehensive
whole and giving meaning to all terms used in the statute, the
Commission's construction of "appurtenant" renders most of the
language in § 59-5-3 superfluous.
literal sense —

unprecedented.

These arguments are —

in a

Indeed, notwithstanding the

extensive briefing that has taken place in this matter, the
Commission has been unable to cite even one authoritative
source —

other than its own assertions and the arguments of

co-counsel —

to sustain its construction of § 59-5-3.

The Commission's presentation regarding the
constitutionality of § 59-5-4.5 as applied to Amax is equally
unpersuasive.

The Commission essentially takes the position

that neither the Commission nor this Court has the power to
examine the constitutionality of a statutory classification
that denies Amax a 20% discount simply because Amax is
centrally rather than locally assessed.

This argument,

however, ignores the factual record in this case which clearly
demonstrates that Amax's property was assessed using the
identical schedules and methods applied to locally assessed
property.

This unabashed discrimination based solely upon a

formal legislative classification does not pass constitutional
muster.

Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, 193

(Utah 1984) ("Certainly the Legislature may not establish
formal classifications of property that result in nonuniform or
disproportionate tax burdens.")

-3-

The Commission's position,

moreover, would preclude judicial review of virtually any
formal classification established by the legislature, thereby
effectively emasculating the provisions of the Utah
Constitution requiring all tangible property to be assessed at
"a uniform and equal rate." Utah Const, art XIII, § 3(1).
Finally, the Commission's arguments are incompatible with
the recent decision of the United States District Court for the
District of Utah in Union Pacific R. R. v. State Tax Comm'n of
Utah, No. C-82-0998J (D. Utah Dec. 19, 1988) (copy attached as
Appendix A).

The Union Pacific court found that the

Commission's refusal to apply § 59-5-4.5 to the real and
personal property of three centrally assessed railroads was
discriminatory under the provisions of the Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (the 'MR
Act"), Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 306, 90 Stat. 31, 54 (1976)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1982)).

Accordingly, the court

enjoined the Commission from refusing to apply § 59-5-4.5 to
the real and personal property of centrally assessed railroads.
Union Pacific, slip op. at 58. As a result, Amax's centrally
assessed real and personal property was not only assessed at a
different rate than locally assessed real property, but at a
different rate than that ordered by the Union Pacific court for
the real and personal property of all centrally assessed
railroads.

Even assuming arguendo that there is some

constitutional basis for discrimination between the classes of
centrally assessed and locally assessed property (see Resp. Br.

-4-

19), there is no constitutional basis for such discrimination
within the class of centrally assessed taxpayers.
ARGUMENT
I.

AMAX'S PROPERTY IS NOT SUBJECT TO CENTRAL
ASSESSMENT UNDER § 59-5-3

There are three alternative conditions provided by § 59-5-3
under which Amax's property may be centrally assessed.

Amax's

Plant and Ponds are subject to central assessment if they are:
(1) located "upon" a mine or mining claim, (2) "appurtenant" to
a mine or mining claim, (3) or used exclusively to process ores
from a mine or mining claim owned by Amax and thereby "deemed
appurtenant" thereto.

Pet. Br. 15.

The Commission concedes

that the mine or mining claim at issue is the Great Salt Lake,
which it admits is owned by the State of Utah, and that Amax's
property is not "upon" this mine (lake).3

The present dispute

regarding the construction of § 59-5-3, therefore, reduces to
whether Amax's property is "appurtenant" or can be "deemed
appurtenant" to a mine owned by Amax.
A.

It is neither.

Amax's Property Is Not "Appurtenant" To A Mine

Although the Commission's discussion of appurtenance begins
with the premise that § 59-5-3's terms should be interpreted

3/

In connection with its discussion of its "Second Rule,"
the Commission clarifies the ambiguity inherent in its
decision as to whether the mine or mining claim to which
the Plant is allegedly "appurtenant" is the Great Salt
Lake or the Ponds. "In this case, the 'mine' is the water
of the Great Salt Lake." Resp. Br. 10. Given this
resolution, the Commission agrees with Amax that the Plant
and Ponds are not "upon" the Great Salt Lake and that this
statutory alternative is not at issue in this appeal. Id.

-5-

"in accord with usually accepted meanings" (Resp. Br. 7), the
Commission's subsequent analysis yields precisely the opposite
conclusion —

namely, that the statutory term "appurtenant"

must be read as having the unusual meaning of "adjacent."
Indeed, the Commission concedes that the property involved here
"cannot pass as 'appurtenances' (as that term [is] ordinarily
understood in real estate)."

Resp. Br. 8.

The only logical

conclusion to be drawn from the Commission's statement of the
"ordinary" meaning of "appurtenant" is that Amax's property is
not appurtenant to a mine.

But, since this logical conclusion

renders Amax's property subject to local assessment, the
Commission is forced to argue that the term "appurtenant" must
mean something other than is "ordinarily understood in real
estate."

Resp. Br. 8.

To concoct a definition of "appurtenant" different from
that "ordinarily understood" (Resp. Br. 8), the Commission
engages in a semantic shell game.

The Commission, first, turns

to various definitions of "appurtenant" and picks out the term
"adjunct."

Resp. Br. 10. The Commission, next, flips to the

definition of "adjunct" and picks out the terms "added or
joined."

Id.

Then, without hesitation, the Commission

announces that "'added or joined' can mean sustantially [sic]
the same thing as 'adjacent,'" a conclusion so "obvious" that
no authoritative support other than the Commission's bald
statement is apparently required.

Id.

Finally, with a grand

verbal flourish, the Commission asserts that the legislature
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"should be understood to mean 'adjunct' or 'adjacent'" when it
used "appurtenant" in drafting § 59-5-3.

Id.

But,

notwithstanding the Commission's creative formatting of
definitions and juxtapositioning of "adjacent" and "adjunct,"
the only place in which the term "adjacent" is even mentioned
let alone used as a synonym for the term "appurtenant"4

—

—

is in

the unsupported declarations of the Commission's own counsel.5
Amax would be delighted if this Court were to afford similar
deference to the opinions of its counsel.

4/

The block quote from Black's Law Dictionary appearing on
page 10 of Respondent's Brief is presumably the result of
unintentional, typographical formatting errors. A careful
review of the definitions cited discloses that, rather
than being a single quote, the indented material actually
consists of two separate quotes interspersed with the
Commission's own commentary. Indeed, the last sentence of
the indented material, which is the only authority cited
by the Commission for the proposition that the term
"adjacent" is a "synonym" for the term "appurtenant," is
the commentary of counsel for the Commission and not a
quotation from Black's Law Dictionary or any other
dictionary.

5/

Apart from its kaleidoscopic rush through various
dictionaries, the only authority the Commission musters to
support its assertion that the legislature did not intend
"to exempt mining property on the Great Salt Lake from
central assessment" (Resp. Br. 8), other than selected
excerpts from the closing argument of co-counsel before the
Commission, jLd. 8-9, is its citation to Crystal Lime &
Cement Co. v. Robbins, 116 Utah 314, 209 P.2d 739 (1949).
As indicated by the very passage quoted by the Commission
from Crystal Lime, however, the issue involved in that case
was the assessment of the surface of non-metalliferous
mining claims with no mention of the location of these
claims with respect to the Great Salt Lake. The decision
simply has nothing to do with the legislature's intent with
respect to the assessment of "mining property" adjacent to,
but concededly not "upon," the surface of the Great Salt
Lake (the mine).

-7-

The Commission's assertion that "appurtenant" means
"adjacent" is bereft of case law support.
single exception,6

In fact, with a

the only cases cited by the Commission are

the cases previously cited by Amax.

Resp. Br. 11. The

Commission, therefore, attempts to distinguish Amax's cases on
the grounds that they deal with the appurtenance of incorporeal
to corporeal property and fail to deal with a factual situation
in which corporeal property has been found to be appurtenant to
other corporeal property.

This purported distinction, however,

misses the entire point of the cases cited by Amax: namely,
that land can never be appurtenant to land regardless of its
physical proximity —
separately owned.

particularly where the two properties are

E.g., Harris v. Elliott, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.)

25, 53 (1836); In re Eastern Boulevard in Borough of the Bronx,

6/

The only independent case cited by the Commission for its
novel interpretation of "appurtenant" is the 1919 decision
of the New York Supreme Court in Brown v. Lehigh Valley R.
R^., 177 N.Y.S. 618, 621 (App. Div. 1919). A careful
reading of this case, however, discloses that the
definition quoted by the Brown court from the Century
Dictionary not only fails to use the term "adjacent," but
the term "adjacent" does not appear anywhere in the case!
Indeed, each of the 30-odd definitions cited by the Brown
court are entirely consistent with the definitions and
cases cited by Amax for the proposition that the term
"appurtenant" does not mean "adjacent." Moreover, the
issue presented to the Brown court for decision was
whether the cab of a locomotive was "appurtenant" to the
boiler of the locomotive within the meaning of the federal
Safety Appliance or Boiler Inspection Acts. Id. at 619.
Thus, even if Brown did contain some statement in dicta
somehow equating the term "appurtenant" with the term
"adjacent," which it does not, Brown is clearly not
controlling with respect to the Utah Legislature's usage
of this term in § 59-5-3.
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Citv of New York, 243 N.Y.S. 57 (App. Div. 1930); Kingsway
Realty & Mortgage Corp. v. Kingsway Repair Corp., 228 N.Y.S.
265 (App. Div. 1928) ; Balcar v. Lee County Cotton Oil Co., 193
S.W. 1094 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). 7

However desperately the

Commission wishes it were otherwise, there is simply no legal
support for the novel proposition that real and personal
property can be "appurtenant" to other property simply because
it is "adjacent" thereto.8

7/

The Commission's discussion is particularly inapposite
with respect to its purported distinction between the
present case and Balcar, 193 S.W. 1094, relied upon by
Amax. Citing one of the tests enunciated by the Balcar
court, i.e., that for two properties to be appurtenant one
must be "absolutely essential and necessary to" the
operation of the other, id. at 1095, the Commission
presents the circular argument that Amax's property "is
essential in the operation of the process of the mine
[Great Salt Lake, because] [w]ithout the Plant and Pond
AMAX could not reduce the brine concentrate to magnesium."
Resp. Br. 13. Such an assertion, however, falls far short
of establishing that either the Plant or the lake are
"essential" to the operation of the other. The selfevident fact that Amax has used the Plant and Ponds to
produce magnesium does not mean that Amax's property is
essential to the operation of the Great Salt Lake.
Several other companies extract and process minerals from
the lake on a non-exclusive basis and presumably will
continue to do so totally independent of the existence or
continued operation of the Amax property. Nor is the lake
essential to the operation of the Plant. As noted in
Amax's opening brief (at 6-7 & n.5), the Plant could have
been built anywhere there was low-cost energy, with
minerals shipped in from any appropriate source.

8/

Even if there were any merit to the Commission's
unconvincing attempt to distinguish the cases cited in
Amax's brief, one would suppose that — at some point in
the extensive briefing which has occurred before both the
Commission and this Court — the Commission would have
been able to cite at least one authority, excepting of
course the authority of its own statements and those of
its co-counsel, for the proposition that "appurtenant"
Footnote continued on next page.
-9-

B.

Amax's Property Cannot Be "Deemed Appurtenant"
To A Mine Owned by Amax

The Commission's final submission regarding § 59-5-3 is
that, even if the Plant and Ponds are not "appurtenant" to the
Great Salt Lake, they must be "deemed" to be appurtenant to the
lake.

Resp. Br. 13-16.

This point is presented in connection

with the Commission's "Third Rule," i.e.. that "[t]he wording
of § 59-5-3 should be read according to its literal wording,
unless it would be unreasonably confused or inoperable." Resp.
Br. 13. The Commission's ensuing discussion, however, not only
ignores this rule but also contradicts the Commission's "First
Rule" that all terms in the statute must be given effect.
Moreover, the Commission's argument ignores its own historical
interpretation of § 59-5-3 in other contexts and as applied to
Amax's property for the 1987 tax year.
The Commission's entire argument on this point is based
upon a grammatical parsing of the last sentence of § 59-5-3.
That sentence provides (emphasis added):
For the purposes of taxation, all mills,
reduction works, and smelters used exclusively for
the purpose of reducing or smelting the ores from a
mine or mining claim by the owner thereof shall be
deemed to be appurtenant to such mine or mining
claim though the same is not upon such mine or
mining claim.

Footnote continued from previous page.
really means "adjacent" and that the legislature really
intended to convey the meaning of "adjacent" even though
it chose to use "appurtenant" in § 59-5-3 and other
statutes. See Pet. Br. 26-27.
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Essentially, the Commission argues that the phrase "by the
owner thereof" modifies the phrase "mills, reduction works, and
smelters" rather than the phrase "mine or mining claim."

This

construction would, however, result in all owners of "mills,
reduction works, and smelters" who reduce or smelt ores from
any "mine or mining claim" being subject to central assessment
—

whether or not the owners also own the mine or mining claim

from which the ores are extracted.

The argument is clever, but

it misses its mark by a mile,
Amax agrees that the Commission has correctly deduced that
the phrase "mills, reduction works and smelters" is the subject
of the restrictive clause "exclusively for the purpose of
reducing or smelting the ores from a mine or mining claim by
the owner thereof."

Unfortunately for the Commission, however,

it has asked the wrong question.

The interpretive issue

presented here is not, as the Commission would have it, "What
is the subject of the restrictive clause?", but rather, "What
is the object of the preposition 'thereof in the restrictive
clause?"

Notwithstanding the normal rules of grammar, which

encourage placing a preposition as close as possible to its
object with no intervening noun, the Commission would have the
Court find that the object of "thereof" is the subject of the
sentence ("mills, reduction works, and smelters"), rather than
the immediately preceding terms "mine or mining claim."
This strained grammatical construction produces the
anomalous result that, whenever the owner of any mill uses it

-11-

to process ores from "a mine/' the mill is subject to central
assessment.

And, since the owner of a mill —

by definition

—

must use it to process the ores from some ''mine,'7 the
Commission's argument would render all mills, reduction works
and smelters subject to central assessment.

As a result, the

earlier terms of the statute, which provide for central
assessment of property "upon" or "appurtenant" to a mine,
become mere surplusage —
First Rule.

in contravention of the Commission's

Had the legislature really intended that all

mills, reduction works and smelters be subject to central
assessment, it could have stated so directly, as it did in the
same statute with respect to all mines and mining claims.
Finally, all parties agree that the Commission has
historically interpreted the last sentence of § 59-5-3 as not

9/

The fact that the legislature did not intend by
indirection to reach a result it could have achieved
directly is further demonstrated by the last clause of
§ 59-5-3: "shall be deemed to be appurtenant to such mine
or mining claim though the same is not upon such mine or
mining claim." Although the antecedent of "the same" is
the subject of the sentence, namely "mills, reductions
works, and smelters," the legislature's careful use of the
words "such mine or mining claim," rather than the phrase
"a mine" as used by the Commission in its brief, must be
given some effect. The only reading of the entire statute
which gives effect to all of its terms is the one
suggested by Amax, namely, that a mill used exclusively by
the owner of a mine to process ores from that mine will be
deemed to be appurtenant to that mine even though it is
not upon or actually appurtenant to that mine. Amax's
construction is further supported by the legislature's
rewording of the the language at issue here, effective
January 1, 1988, to substitute the term "that mine" for
the term "such mine." Utah Code. Ann. § 59-2-201(d)
(Supp. 1988).

-12-

being applicable to the Geneva steel mill, although it is
clearly used by its owner exclusively to process iron ore from
"a mine" not owned by Geneva.

In contrast, the statute has

been consistently applied by the Commission to Kennecott's
copper refinery, which is used exclusively to process copper
and other ores from the Bingham Canyon mine owned by Kennecott.
Tr. at 268.

And, with respect to the 1987 tax year, when

Kaiser was the exclusive supplier of all brines processed by
Amax from the same Great Salt Lake "mine" owned by the state,
the Division of Property Taxation, acting on behalf of the
Commission, conceded that the Plant and Ponds should be locally
assessed.

Tr. at 146.

The Commission's last minute,

disingenuous reconstruction of the last sentence of § 59-5-3
should therefore be disregarded.
Amax's interpretation of the terms "upon," "appurtenant,"
and "deemed appurtenant," as used in § 59-5-3, is the only
construction which satisfies each of the three rules of
statutory construction advocated —
Commission.

but ignored —

by the

Accordingly, this Court should find that § 59-5-3

must be applied in a manner consistent with both its plain
meaning and the Commission's historical interpretation.

The

Court should further implement these findings by holding that
the Commission does not have authority under § 59-5-3 to assess
the tangible real and personal property of Amax.

-13-

II.

THE COMMISSION'S REFUSAL TO EXTEND THE 2 0% DISCOUNT OF
§ 59-5-4-5 TO AMAX'S PROPERTY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Assuming that this Court accepts Amax's analysis of § 59-5-3 and
agrees that Amax's property should have been locally assessed,
both the Commission and Tooele County have historically applied
the 20% discount provided by § 59-5-4.5 only to locally
assessed real property.
& n.49.

Id.; Union Pacific, slip op. at 52-53,

This is erroneous, inasmuch as the express wording of

the statute applies to all "taxable property."

Since both real

and tangible personal property are subject to ad valorem
taxation, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-5-6(1), 59-5-7, there is
no statutory basis for the Commission or the county assessors
to apply the 20% reduction mandated by § 59-5-4.5 for all
"taxable property" to real but not to personal property.
Accordingly, even if this Court accepts Amax's position that
its property must be locally assessed (and is therefore
entitled to the benefit of § 59-5-4.5), the Court must still
determine whether the Commission's refusal to apply the statute
to Amax's personal and real property violates the express
statutory language of § 59-5-4.5 as well as the constitutional
mandate of "a uniform and equal rate of assessment on all
tangible property."

Utah Const, art. XIII, § 3(1).

The Commission's submission regarding the constitutionality
of § 59-5-4.5 as applied to Amax is essentially two-fold.
First, the Commission suggests that neither it nor this Court
can hold the statute unconstitutional as applied.
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Resp. Br. 20

(because § 59-5-4.5 does not in express terms apply to
centrally assessed property, the Commission "does not have the
authority" to consider the constitutionality of § 59-5-4.5 and
neither the Commission nor the Court has the power "to extend
the coverage of section 59-5-4.5 to centrally assessed
properites [sic]").
straightforward —

Second, the Commission makes the
but untenable —

assertion that § 59-5-4.5

is constitutional simply because the legislature passed it.
Resp. Br. 23 ("the legislature has plenary power in making such
distinctions").

These conclusionary assertions, however,

ignore the fundamental constitutional doctrine that each of the
three separate branches of government was created to provide
independent checks on the power of the others.10

10/ Not only would the Commission have this Court defer to the
legislature's "plenary power in making . . . distinctions
. . . between centrally assessed and county assessed
properties" (Resp. Br. 23), it would also have this Court
defer to the Commission's interpretation of the taxing
statutes it is charged to administer, including § 59-5-4.5
Id. This argument, however, is blatantly disingenuous.
Since the Commission has already admitted that it "does
not have the authority to declare section 59-5-4.5
unconstitutional" (Resp. Br. 20), how can it have arrived
at an "interpretation" that this section is constitutional
to which this Court must defer? In any event, with
respect to issues of law — particularly those relating to
constitutional questions — this Court has consistently
ruled that it is not bound by the constitutional
pronouncements of administrative agencies or lower
judicial tribunals, nor does it give blind obeisance to
legislative "distinctions." Hurley v. Board of Review, 98
Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 21 (Utah, 1988); Utah Dep't of Admin.
Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 601, 607-12 (Utah
1983) :
In reviewing the Commission's
interpretations of general questions of law,
Footnote continued on next page.
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The Commission claims that, because of the inherent
institutional limitations of administrative bodies, it lacks the
power to pass upon the constitutionality or to extend the
benefits of § 59-5-4.5 to Amax.

Resp. Br. 20.

Although the

Commission does not assert in so many words that this Court is
similarly fettered,11

it attempts to reach the same result with

the bald assertion ''that the judiciary does not supplant the
legislature when passing upon the constitutional validity of
statutes."

Resp. Br. 21.

In short, the Commission suggests that

this Court (like the Commission) is institutionally incapable of
remedying any possible constitutional defect in the operation of
§ 59-5-4.5.

The only authority cited for this novel limitation

upon the judicial power is a statement by the Wyoming Supreme
Court acknowledging that its procedural rules can not "be
interpreted to have directly repealed" certain Wyoming statutes.
Resp. Br. 21 (citing McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1290
(Wyo. 1980)).

Footnote continued from previous page.
this Court applies a correction-of-error
standard, with no deference to the expertise
of the Commission. General questions of law
include interpretation of the United States
Constitution and the Acts of Congress, and
interpretation of the Utah Constitution and
the Acts of the Legislature.
Utah Dep't at Admin. Serv.. 658 P.2d at 608; Allen v.
Rampton. 23 Utah 2d 336, 34J5, 463 P.2d 7, 13 (Utah 1969).
11/ The Commission, in fact, somewhat begrudgingly
acknowledges that this Court "could declare section
59-5-4.5 unconstitutional." Resp. Br. 20.
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As indicated by the very passage quoted by the Commission,
however, McGuire has absolutely nothing to do with the powers
expressly delegated to this Court to directly consider the
constitutionality of challenged legislative distinctions.
Const, art. VIII, § 2.12

Utah

Indeed, this Court acknowledged in Rio

Alaom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, at 194 (Utah 1984)
that "[t]he overarching purpose of §§ 2 and 3 of Article XIII [of
the Utah Constitution] is to achieve uniformity in the ad valorem
taxing scheme."

As the authorities cited in Amax's opening brief

(at 43-44) unanimously conclude, the only way that this
"overarching purpose" can be fulfilled is the extension of
§ 59-5-4.5 to all taxpayers from whom it has been
unconstitutionally withheld.

Amax is one such taxpayer.

The Commission's second argument —

that any and all

classifications made by § 59-5-4.5 pass constitutional muster
simply because the legislature made them —
than the preceding submission.

is even more flawed

As is more fully discussed in

Amax's opening brief, this Court's decision in Rio Alqom, which

12/ Even the most cursory reading of McGuire discloses that
the issue presented involved the appropriate procedures to
be followed by County Commissioners in considering an
application filed under certain Wyoming statutes for the
creation of a private road. The excerpt from McGuire
quoted by the Commission was merely the Wyoming Supreme
Court's confirmation of the fundamental principle that,
where the legislature has created a separate
administrative body with its own statutory procedural
requirements, these procedural requirements may not be
"repealed" by the judicial rules of appellate procedure
applicable to review of lower court proceedings. McGuire,
608 P.2d at 1290.

-17-

upheld the facial validity of § 59-5-3, was premised upon the
legislature's assumption that centrally assessed properties are
appraised using different methods which produce lower values than
the methods applied to locally assessed properties.

The

Commission, however, does not dispute the fact that, in this
case, the record clearly establishes that this legislative
assumption is unfounded and that Amax's property was assessed
under the identical schedules and methodologies applied by county
assessors.

The Commission's only response is that the

legislature is free to make whatever assumptions it chooses with
respect to the treatment of centrally and locally assessed
taxpayers, and that this Court should not thereafter inquire into
the validity of those underlying assumptions.

Resp. Br. 19-23.

The Commission also asserts that once legislative classes are
created, both the Commission and this Court must turn their backs
upon any discriminatory treatment between the classes, so long as
all taxpayers within the classes are similarly discriminated
against.

Resp. Br. 19 ("AMAX, as a centrally assessed property

owner, is treated uniformly and equally with all other centrally
assessed property owners").
The foregoing submissions, of course, are patently erroneous.
Amax will not burden this Court with a repetition of the analysis
refuting the Commission's strained arguments.
42.

See Pet. Br. 3 3-

Suffice it to note that the Court itself has recognized that

"[c]ertainly the Legislature may not establish formal
classifications of property that result in nonuniform or
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disproportionate tax burdens.7' Rio Alaom, 681 P. 2d at 193.
There is nothing to support the constitutionality of the
Commission's refusal to apply § 59-5-4.5 in assessing Amax's
property other than the arid classification of Amax's property as
"centrally assessed."

When such a formal classification results

in "nonuniform or disproportionate tax burdens" (Rio Alaom, 681
P.2d at 193), it cannot survive scrutiny under Article XIII,
Section 3 of the Utah Constitution.
Finally, even assuming the legal correctness of the
Commission's argument (i.e. , that the constitutionality of
§ 59-5-3 must be upheld so long as Amax is treated the same as
other centrally assessed taxpayers), the Commission's underlying
assumption —
treated —

that all centrally assessed taxpayers are similarly

is no longer factually accurate.

As previously noted,

the United States District Court for the District of Utah has
recently ruled that the 20% discount provided by § 59-5-4.5 for
locally assessed real property must be extended to all
property —

both real and personal —

owned by centrally

assessed railroads operating within the State of Utah.

Union

Pacific, slip op.13

13/ All of the parties in Union Pacific agreed "that the
proper approach for valuing a railroad for taxation
purposes is the so-called unitary approach" under which
"the state determines the value of the entire railroad as
a unit." Xd. at 8 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the
order of the Union Pacific court adjusting "assessed
values" necessarily applied to the value of the entire
railroads, as allocated to Utah, including all their real
and personal property.
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In Union Pacific, three centrally assessed railroads brought
actions in federal court alleging that the Commission's refusal
during the 1984 and 1985 tax years to extend to their property
the same 20% discount applied to locally assessed commercial and
industrial property constituted discriminatory treatment within
the meaning of the 4R Act.

The operative section of this act

makes it unlawful for a state to assess railroad
transportation property at a value which bears a higher
ratio to the true market value of such transportation
property than the ratio which the assessed value of all
other commercial and industrial property in the same
assessment jurisdiction bears to the true market value
of all such other commercial and industrial property.
Union Pacific, slip op. at 3.
Because the actions were brought under the 4R Act, the
Union Pacific court was not required to address the
constitutionality of § 59-5-4.5.1U

The Commission, however,

relied upon the statute's asserted constitutionality, as well
as this Court's decision in Rio Algom, to support its authority
to centrally assess the railroads and to deny their properties
the 20% discount extended to locally assessed real property.
The Union Pacific court, therefore, was faced with essentially
the same arguments presented by the Commission here.

The

14/ Nevertheless, the district court expressed serious doubt
regarding the constitutionality of § 59-5-4.5. The court
pointedly discussed the legislative history outlined in
Rio Alcfom and found that "[t]he evidence in this case
makes the legislature's assumptions [concerning the
differences in valuation of state-assessed and locally
assessed properties] suspect." Union Pacific, slip op. at
54-55, n.52.
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district court concluded that they lacked merit•

Indeed, the

court found that
it is clear that the state of Utah has discriminated
against the plaintiff railroads in its tax assessments
of the plaintiffs for the years 1984 and 1985 in that it
has assessed them at a higher rate than it assessed all
other commercial and industrial property within the
state for the same period.
Union Pacific, slip op. at 58.

Accordingly, the Union Pacific

court ordered the Commission to assess the railroads at a ratio
which took into account the 20% statutory discount extended to
locally assessed real property and enjoined the Commission from
collecting property taxes for the 1984 and 1985 tax years at a
higher ratio.

Icl. at 59.

The effect of the Union Pacific decision is that, as of
January 1, 1986, the tax lien date for Amax's property in the
present case, the 20% discount of § 59-5-4.5 extended not only
to the class of locally assessed real property but also to all
real and personal property of railroads included within the
class of centrally assessed taxpayers.

Thus, irrespective of

whether the Commission, or this Court, agrees with the Union
Pacific court's interpretation of the 4R Act, the effect of
that decision in creating a new class of taxpayers within the
class of centrally assessed taxpayers cannot be ignored.
As noted in Amax's opening brief, the Utah Legislature has
repeatedly postponed the statutory deadline in § 59-5-4.5(2)
requiring the Commission to "develop and implement sales and
cost appraisal methods in valuing taxable property."
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Id.; Pet.

Br, 45, n.43.

These methods are intended to remove nontaxable,

intangible values from assessment.15

Until these methods are

developed and implemented for all "taxable property," the
impermissible discrimination between centrally and locally
assessed taxpayers, and even between locally assessed real and
personal property, embodied in the Commission's interpretation
of § 59-5-4.5 will continue.

Pet. Br. 45, n.43.16

The

uncontroverted record in this case clearly demonstrates the
fallacy of the assumptions which lent the only aura of
justification to the Commission's limited application of
§ 59-5-4.5 solely to locally assessed real property.

See

Recent Developments in Utah Law, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 131, 214
(1985) (noting that, despite the reasoning in Rio Alqom,
§ 59-5-4.5 "arguably is unconstitutional").

Moreover, as a

result of the Union Pacific decision, this Court cannot ignore
the fact that even all centrally assessed taxpayers are no
longer similarly discriminated against.

Accordingly, this

Court must not allow the legislature and the Commission to
continue to evade the clear requirements of the Utah and United
States Constitutions.

Allen v. Rampton, 23 Utah 2d at 345, 463

P.2d at 13 (1969) ("we cannot shirk our duty to say that an act

15/ See Pet. Br. at 46-47 for a discussion of the
constitutional and statutory prohibitions against the
assessment of property taxes on intangible property.
16/ The Utah Legislature is again sitting. Amax's counsel has
been informed that the "temporary" 20% tax break for
locally assessed properties will once again be extended
for another year. See Pet. Br. 45, n. 43.
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of the legislature is unconstitutional when it clearly appears
to us that it conflicts with some provision of the state
Constitution").
CONCLUSION
The final decision of the Commission should be reversed.
The Court should direct that Amax's property is properly
assessable by Tooele County rather than by the Commission and,
accordingly, that § 59-5-4.5 controls the determination of the
"reasonable fair cash value" of Amax's real and personal
property.

In the alternative, the Court should direct the

Commission to calculate the "reasonable fair cash value" of
Amax's real and personal property pursuant to the formula set
out in § 59-5-4.5.
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of January, 1989.
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN

/H/jillkfiuMl'
Mark K. Buchl (#0475)
David K. Detton (#0874)
Richard G. Wilkins (#4950)
50 South Main, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
(801) 521-5800
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Appendix A

APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
and THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF
UTAH and STATE OF UTAH,
Defendants,
and
SALT LAKE COJNTY, et al.,
Defendants in
Intervention.
SOUTHERN PACIFIC
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
VS.

STATE OF UTAH, et al.,
Defendants,
and
SALT LAKE COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants in
Intervention.

Case Nos.
C-84-0839J
C-84-0840J
consolidated under
Case No. C-82-0998J
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

The plaintiff railroads—Union Pacific (UP), the Denver &
Rio Grande Western (D&RG) and Southern Pacific (SP)—brought
these consolidated actions to challenge their ad valorem property
tax assessments for 1984 and 1985 on the grounds that the
assessments discriminated against them in violation of section
306 of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of
1976 (the 4R Act), Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 306, 90 Stat. 31, 54
(1976).

The cases were tried to the court beginning on February

9, 1988, and ending on March 17, 1988, with some brief respites
in between.

The court heard closing arguments on March 30, 1988.

Robert A. Peterson and Eric C. Olson represented the plaintiffs
UP and D&RG.

L. Ridd Larson and William A. Marshall represented

plaintiff SP.

Rex E. Madsen, Reed L. Martineau and Maxwell A.

Miller represented the defendants, and Bill Thomas Peters
represented the defendants in intervention, some twenty Utah
counties.1

There were 788 exhibits, some of great complexity.

After digesting the evidence and the arguments of counsel, the
court now enters this memorandum opinion and order, which, under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), shall constitute the
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.

1

The intervening counties are Box Elder, Cache, Carbon,
Davis, Emery, Grand, Iron, Juab, Millard, Morgan, Piute, Salt
Lake, Sanpete, Sevier, Summit, Tooele, Utah, Wasatch, Washington
and Weber.

2

I.
THE STATUTE

In 1976, in part to "restore the financial stability of the
railway system of the United States,11 Pub. L. No. 94-210, §
101(a), 90 Stat. 31, 33 (1976), Congress passed the 4R Act.
Section 306 of the act, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11503, prohibits
states and local taxing authorities from discriminating against
railroad property.

That section makes it unlawful for a state to

assess railroad
transportation property at a value which bears a higher
ratio to the true market value of such transportation
property than the ratio which the assessed value of all
other commercial and industrial property in the same
assessment jurisdiction bears to the true market value
of all such other commercial and industrial property.
Id. § 306(1)(a), 90 Stat, at 54.2

A railroad that thinks it has

been treated unfairly may bring an action in federal district
court for injunctive and declaratory relief.
court is then required to compare two ratios:

Id. § 306(2).

The

the ratio of the

assessed value of rail transportation property to its true
market value, and the ratio of the assessed value of all other
commercial and industrial property in the same assessment
jurisdiction to its true market value.

2

The court may grant

The wording and structure of section 306 were changed
when the section was recodified as part of the revised Interstate
Commerce Act. See Act of Oct. 17, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-473, §
11503, 92 Stat. 1337, 1445-46. Because the recodification was
not meant to change the substantive law, see id. § 3(a), 92 Stat,
at 1466, this court will use the original language of section 306
for convenience and clarity.

3

relief to the railroad only if the ratio of assessed value to
true market value for rail transportation property "exceeds by at
least 5 per centum the ratio of assessed value to true market
value, with respect to all other commercial and industrial
property in the same assessment jurisdiction" (in this case, the
state of Utah).

Id. § 306(2)(c).3

The plaintiff railroads claimed that Utah had discriminated
against them in two ways:

by overvaluing their property and by

denying them a twenty-percent discount in their assessed value
that was available to locally assessed commercial and industrial
real property under Utah law, Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5 (Supp.
1986).

Plaintiff SP settled its valuation claim with the state

before trial. At the trial, the parties presented the court with

3

The court1s analysis can be expressed by a simple
equation:
Assessed value of
rail transportation
property

Assessed value of
all other commercial
and industrial property

?

x 1.05

>

True market value of
rail transportation
property

True market value of
all other commercial
and industrial property

At the time of the assessments at issue in this case, Utah
law required that all taxable property in the state not
specifically exempt from taxation be assessed "at 20% of its
reasonable fair cash value." See Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-1 (Supp.
1985); see also infra note 6 ("reasonable fair cash value" is
synonymous with "true market value"). Thus, the ratio for both
rail transportation property and all other commercial and
industrial property for the years in question should be .20.
In 1985 the statute was amended to make the assessed value
the same as "reasonable fair cash value." However, the statute
did not take effect until January 1, 1986. See 1985 Utah Laws
ch. 165, § 64.

4

a stipulation setting forth two alternatives for the ratio of
assessed value to true market value for all other commercial and
industrial property in Utah—one ratio if the court upholds the
twenty-percent discount statute and another if the court strikes
down the twenty-percent discount statute.4

Because the

railroads' assessed value is given, see infra note 48 and
accompanying text, the only issues for the court to decide are
the true market value of the UP and D&RG as of the assessment
dates (January 1, 1984, and January 1, 1985) and the allegedly
discriminatory effect of the twenty-percent discount statute.
The court will consider these issues in order.

II.
THE PLAINTIFFS' VALUATION CLAIMS

Plaintiffs UP and D&RG claim that Utah has discriminated
against them by overvaluing their rail transportation property
for the assessment years 1984 and 1985.5

To determine whether

4

In other words, the parties have stipulated to the right
half of the equation set forth in footnote 3, supra. Which
stipulated value the court will ultimately apply depends on the
court's holding on the plaintiffs1 claim of de jure
discrimination under the equalization aspect of this case. See
infra part III.
5

Originally UP took the position that it was foreclosed
from challenging the statefs• valuation of its property by the
Tenth Circuitfs decision in Burlington Northern Railroad Company
v. Lennen, 715 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1983), cert, denied. 467 U.S.
1230 (1984). See Union Pac. R. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 635 F.
Supp. 1060, 1063 (D. Utah 1986). However, the Supreme Court
opened the door for UP to assert its valuation claims in this
case by its decision in Burlington Northern Railroad Company v.
5

that is so, the court must determine the plaintiffs1 true market
value and then compare that figure to the state's assessed
value, which was based on the state's determination of the
plaintiffs' true market value.6

Under Utah law, the plaintiffs'

assessed value for assessment years 1984 and 1985 should be .20
of their true market value.

See supra note 3.

If it is greater,

then the state has overvalued the railroads, regardless of any
equalization claim they may have.
The court's task is complicated by the fact that the
defendants concede that the plaintiffs' initial assessed values
for 1984 and 1985 were not based on their true market value.

In

May 1984 the state assessed UP based on a true market value of
$3,875,000,000.

On June 4, 1984, the state issued a revised

assessment for UP based on a true market value of $3,600,000,000.
The state has since become convinced that the methods it used to
arrive at those figures were wrong and has abandoned those
appraisals.
350-51.

See Transcript [hereinafter Tr.] at 341, 345-46,

For trial the state relies on a new appraisal for UP

Oklahoma Tax Commission. 107 S. Ct. 1855 (1987). Ironically, SP,
which had asserted that Lennen did not preclude it from
challenging the state's valuation, see 635 F. Supp. at 1065-66,
is no longer asserting a valuation claim, it having settled its
valuation dispute with the state.
6

Utah law requires that taxable property within the state
be assessed on the basis of its "reasonable fair cash value."
See Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-1; see also supra note 3. "Reasonable
fair cash value" is equivalent to "market value." Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County. 122 Utah 431, 250 P.2d 938,
939-40 (1952). For simplicity, unless otherwise indicated the
court shall use the terms "value" and "true market value" to
refer to both "reasonable fair cash value" and "true market
value."
6

based on a different approach, which places the value of UP for
assessment year 1984 at $3,700,000,000. The state followed a
similar approach for UP for assessment year 1985 and for the D&RG
for 1984 and 1985, with similar results.7

Thus, the defendants

concede that the plaintiffs were assessed at rates that were not
based on their true market value for assessment years 1984 and
To determine how much the plaintiffs1 newly determined

1985•

values differ from their "true market value," if at all, the
court must still determine their true market value as of January
1, 1984, and January 1, 1985.
In deciding the valuation question, the court has the
advantage of expert help.

The plaintiffs have presented the

appraisals of their expert witness, Dr. Arthur Schoenwald, a
financial consultant specializing in railroad and utility ratemaking and valuation.

See common exhibits 30 & 33, 36 & 39. The*

defendants rely on the newly prepared appraisals of Mr. Ekhardt
Prawitt, the utility and railroad valuation manager for the
Property Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission.

See

common exhibits 32, 35, 38 & 41. However, to bolster Mr.
Prawittfs appraisals, the defendants also offered appraisals
7

The statefs original assessment for UP for assessment
year 1985 was based on a true market value of $4 billion. In
this proceeding, the state relies on a new appraisal, which
places the value of UP for 1985 at $3.4 billion.
The state initially valued the D&RG based on a true market
value of $370 million for assessment year 1984. In June 1984 it
revised its valuation based on a value of $340 million. In this
proceeding it relies on a new appraisal placing the true market
value of the D&RG at $320 million. Similarly, it initially
valued the D&RG for 1985 at $375 million and now relies on a new
appraisal placing the true market value at $320 million.

7

prepared jointly by Mr. Michael Goodwin, an independent appraiser
specializing in the valuation of public utilities, railroads and
other multistate corporations, and Dr. James Ifflander, an
assistant professor of finance at Arizona State University.

See

common exhibits 31, 34, 37 & 40. The plaintiffs and intervenors
also offered the testimony of various experts retained to
critique or comment on the competing appraisals.
Unfortunately, all these expert opinions may only verify
George Bernard Shawfs observation that,

lf

[i]f all economists were

laid end to end, they would not reach a conclusion."

The

operative word here is f,aff; for, after listening to seventeen
full days' of expert testimony spread over six weeks, the court
suffers from no lack of conclusions.

The problem is that the

proffered expert conclusions differ from one another by over a
billion dollars in the case of UP and by a like order of
magnitude in the case of the D&RG.8
agree on some things.

Fortunately, the parties do

To that extent, the court can begin on

common ground.
The parties agree, for example, that the proper approach for
valuing a railroad for taxation purposes is the so-called unitary
approach.

Under that approach, the state determines the value of

the entire railroad as a unit, even though its assets may be
located in several states, and then allocates a portion of that
total value to the taxing state (in this case, Utah) based on
8

The results of the various appraisals are summarized in
appendix A.

8

such factors as the percentage of the railroadfs total trackage
that runs through the taxing state.

The parties also agree on

the percentage of the total value of each railroad1s property
that should be allocated to Utah.
accompanying text; Tr. at 13-14.

See infra note 47 and
Finally, the parties agree in

principle on the three standard methods for valuing a railroad:
the cost approach, the income approach and the stock and debt
approach.

It is in applying the three standard approaches to

reach a conclusion as to true market value that the parties part
ways.

A.

Overview of Valuation Approaches

At the risk of oversimplification,9 the court can summarize
the three basic approaches as follows.
The Cost Approach.

The cost approach values a railroad

based on historical costs—that is, how much it actually cost to
produce the assets initially.

From historical cost is deducted

accumulated depreciation to get net book value.

Then, from net

book value an amount is deducted to reflect obsolescence.
final figure is the cost indicator of value.

9

The

All the parties

Cf. Louis L. Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search
for Intermediate Premises. 80 Harv. L. Rev. 986, 991 (1967) ("It
is, of course, one of the risks of subjecting complex
controversies to judicial determination that the rules evolved
compel arbitrary simplification").

9

agree that the cost indicator is the least accurate indicator of
true market value.10
The Stock and Debt Approach.
a substitute market approach.

The stock and debt approach is

Because of the infrequent sales of

railroad properties, the absence of an organized market for such
properties and the lack of accurate, current information about
sales of railroad properties as such, appraisers must look to a
substitute source for accurate information.

There is an

organized market for the purchase and sale of fractional
ownership interests in railroad properties; shares or ownership
interests in debt, bonds and such are bought and sold with some
regularity.

A specialist in dealing with such shares on an

organized exchange "makes a market" for them.
He offers to sell.
sell.

He offers to buy.

He can thus respond to offers to buy and

An appraiser uses such market information as some

indication of value.
Those who use such data assume that the "market" has depth
as of a particular moment in time and that multiplying the market
value of the fractional share by the number of outstanding shares
will produce a figure equal to the whole market value, which,
when added to outstanding debt, will produce an approximation of
true market value of company assets subject to ad valorem
taxation.

The argument is that the whole is equal to the sum of

10

Although he calculates a cost indicator of value, Dr.
Schoenwald gives it no weight in determining the final value of
the railroads. The other appraisers give it some weight but less
than they give the other indicators of value.

10

its parts, a conservative position, one could argue, in today's
era of leveraged buyouts.

It does not factor in the element of

control or the break-up value frequently perceived by some to be
hidden in the assets of a target company.
Often the outstanding shares of a railroad are held in their
entirety by a holding company.

The organized market to which an

appraiser looks for data is in the shares of the holding
company—not in the shares of the railroad.

Thus, the data to

which the appraiser looks for an indication of value is two steps
removed from the actual assets appraised.

The appraiser must

determine in some appropriate fashion what fraction of the market
value attributed to the shares of the holding company is
represented by the holding company's ownership, through its
railroad subsidiary, of railroad assets.
In applying the stock-and-debt approach, there is relatively
little disagreement among the parties as to the value of the
plaintiff companies' debt.

See, e.g.f Tr. at 1243.

The main

disagreement is over the companies' equity value and specifically
over how to determine what portion of the holding company's gross
equity is attributable to railroad property.
The state of Utah uses basically two approaches for
attributing a portion of the holding company's equity to the
railroad.

Both use various multipliers.

In the first approach,

the state compares the subject railroad to other railroads in the
industry.

It calculates an industry multiplier based on the

ratio of various railroads' stock prices to their cash flows and
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earnings.

It then applies those price/cash flow and

price/earnings ratios or multipliers to the subject railroad's
cash flow and earnings to get estimates of the value of the
railroad's stock.

In its second approach, the state compares the

subject railroad to its holding company.

The state calculates

multipliers based on the ratio of the railroad's net profit,
revenues, income and assets to the holding company's net profit,
revenues, income and assets and applies the multipliers to the
company's total equity value to determine the equity value of the
railroad.

See, e.g.. common ex. 32 at S/2.

On the other hand, Dr. Schoenwald, the railroads' expert,
calculates the equity value of each of the nonrail assets of the
holding company and deducts those values from the holding
company's total equity value.

What's left over, he concludes, is

the equity value of the railroad.
The Income Approach.

The theory behird the income approach

is that anyone who buys a railroad buys it only for the income
the railroad will generate.

The basic principle is that the

present value of a company is equal to the value of all future
benefits to be derived from ownership of the company, discounted
to their present value (expressed in dollars).

Since the future

benefits to be derived from ownership of a company are simply the
income one can expect to receive from the company, the income
approach tries to project the income from the railroad's
operations over a period of time and then places a present value
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on that income.11

The present value of future income is

expressed by the following formula:
II
V0 =

I2
+

(1 + i ) 1

m
T + • • •+

(1 + i ) 2

(1 + i ) n

where V 0 is the value at time zero, Ii

is the income for year 1,

and i is an interest rate or discount rate.
Obviously, this basic valuation formula is almost impossible
to apply accurately because one can't know precisely the value of
all the variables.

It is impossible to predict accurately the

income for each future year for the life of the railroad, to
know how long the railroad will continue to produce income and
to predict the appropriate interest rate for future years. Thus,
each of the appraisers in this case simplifies the basic formula
based on certain assumptions.
All the experts essentially agree on at least one
simplification of the basic formula, namely,
V0 =

,
k-g

where CFx represents the net cash flow in period 1, k represents
the cost of capital, and g represents the growth rate. See
11

The court uses the term "income" loosely. More
precisely, what the appraiser tries to value is net cash flow,
which Dr. Schoenwald defined as net operating income plus
depreciation and deferred income taxes (where applicable) less
capital expenditures. See pltffs1 ex. 73. Because capital
expenditures for railroads in recent years have generally
exceeded depreciation and deferred taxes, Dr. Schoenwald has used
net railroad operating income (NROI)—which he characterizes as a
"generous" measure of net cash flows—as his income stream to
capitalize.
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pltffs' ex. 358 (Dr. Schoenwald); Tr. at 1088 (Dr. Ifflander) &
1455 (Dr. Pettit).12
This approach to income valuation, which tries to estimate
future cash flows over a period of time and discount them to
their present value, is called yield capitalization or a
"discounted cash flow" (DCF) model and is widely used (in one
form or another) by appraisers and financial analysts to value
income-producing property.

See, e.g., Tr. at 1348-49 (testimony

of Dr. Ifflander), 1491 (testimony of Dr. Pettit), 1728
(testimony of Mr. Van Drimmelen, a real estate appraiser), 2077
(testimony of Mr. Fitzgerald).13
12

All of the experts also basically agree on another
variation of the basic model, the dividend model. See, e.g.,
pltffs' ex. 54; Tr. at 1088-89. The dividend model uses
dividends paid out in year 1 as the income to be capitalized and
is expressed by the following equation:
Di
V0 k-g
where D]^ is the dividends at year 1 and g is the growth rate.
The basic formula was also sometimes recast to include another
variable, b, which represents the percentage of the firm's
earnings that it retains to reinvest:
Ei(l-b)

v0
k-g
where E^ is the earnings in period 1.
intervenors1 ex. 6.
13

See Tr. at 1455;

Mr. Goodwin and Dr. Ifflander used (or misused, from the
plaintiffs1 perspective) a standard yield capitalization or DCF
model for their appraisal of UP for 1984, in which they
projected the railroadfs cash flows for the next five years,
discounted them to present value and added a terminal value,
representing the present value of all the cash flows after the
five-year period. See common ex. 31 at 76-102. For all of the

14

The standard simplifications of the basic formula used in a
yield capitalization model assume that k, g and b (the retention
rate, see supra note 12) are constant and are all equally
influenced by inflation.

They also assume that the growth rate,

g, is equal to b times r, the marginal rate of return on new
investment.

See Tr. at 1455.

The plaintiffs1 appraiser, Dr. Schoenwald, on the other
hand, starts from the basic formula but makes a different
assumption, namely, that r (the rate of return on new investment)
equals k (the cost of capital).

Using this assumption, he

simplifies the basic formula to
NCFx
V0 k
where NCFi is the net cash flow for year l. 14
eliminated growth from the equation.

In essence, he has

He is able to do this

because, given his assumption that r equals k, any growth in the
company's future earnings is merely expansion growth and not real
growth; thus, according to the witness, it does not add anything

years in question, they also use a direct capitalization method,
similar to the state1s. See infra pp. 16-17.
14

Dr. Schoenwald further assumes that net railroad
operating income (NROI) is a generous estimate of net cash flow,
see supra note 11, so he substitutes NROI for NCF in the
equation. For his projected net railroad operating income for
year 1 he uses an average of the railroadfs NROI for the five
previous years.

15

to present value.1D

Hence, Dr. Ifflander has called Dr.

Schoenwald's income valuation model an expansion model, a term
the court will use at times to distinguish it from the standard
yield capitalization model. Although Dr. Schoenwald's model is
in theory a yield capitalization model, it proceeds from a very
different assumption than the standard yield capitalization
models described by the other experts.16
The state uses another method to value the railroads based
on their projected income, called direct capitalization.

In the

direct capitalization method, the appraiser determines a
company's value by multiplying its accounting earnings by a
price/earnings ratio or by dividing the earnings by the
15

According to Dr. Schoenwald, a company may grow through
new, additional investment, but if the returns on new investment
are not greater than the cost of capital—that is, if the cost of
the growth offsets any gain from the new investment—then there
is no actual or net growth. Net growth occurs when the company
earns more than the cost of its additional capital, and only net
growth—as opposed to gross or expansion growth—increases net
present value. A company that only earns its cost of capital may
grow, and that growth may make the company worth more five years
down the road, but that future growth adds nothing to the
company's value today because it will cost the company as much as
it will add to its value in the future. See Tr. at 33-39;
pltffs' ex. 54.
16

The court has spared the reader the mathematical
manipulations by which one gets from one formula to another.
Suffice it to say that the various formulae appear to be
mathematically correct and internally consistent if one accepts
the underlying assumptions. It is a simple matter of applying
mathematical principles to the basic formula. In making that
application, however, one should bear in mind Robert Heilbroner's
observation that "[m]athematics has given economics rigor; but
alas, also mortis." The simplified formulae are no better than
the basic formula and the experts' assumptions.

16

earnings/price ratio.

The ratios are derived from stock market

data for comparable companies.
Under the statefs direct capitalization method, value at
time zero (V0) is equal to earnings for time 1 (E^ divided by
the earnings-price ratio (E/P), or, expressing the relationship
algebraically,
El
V0 -

•
E/P

Although not directly derived from the basic valuation
formula,17 the direct capitalization method proceeds from the
assumption that the price of a company's stock will represent the
consensus of investors1 opinions about a companyfs future cash
flows, cost of capital and growth prospects.

In other words, it

uses the stock market as the best evidence of willing buyers' and
sellers' opinions of value, which presumably are based on their
own yield capitalization analyses.
For its earnings figure, the state uses a five-year weighted
average of the railroad's net operating income, adjusted for
inflation, in which income for more recent years is weighted
more heavily than income for earlier years.
Obviously, the two basic questions in applying the income
approach are, How do you define the income stream to be
17

While recognizing that direct capitalization is not
merely a variation of the yield capitalization model, by making
certain assumptions, Dr. Ifflander showed how one might conclude
that Dr. Schoenwald's expansion model also uses an
earnings/price ratio for its capitalization rate (k). See Tr. at
1107-09.
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capitalized? and What capitalization rate do you use?

Although

the parties disagree somewhat about what constitutes the proper
income stream to capitalize, their most fundamental disagreement
is over the capitalization rate. As one can see from the basic
valuation formulae, since the capitalization rate is a fraction
that appears in the denominator, a small change in the
capitalization rate can produce a big difference in computed
value.18
The plaintiffs argue that the state's capitalization rates,
which vary from 8.28 to 11.98 percent, see appendix A, are
clearly wrong since all the experts agreed that the driving force
behind the capitalization rate, however expressed, namely, the
cost of capital (debt and equity), was no less than 13 percent
and closer to 15 percent during the relevant periods.

See, e.g.,

interveners' exs. la through Id at 2. However, that argument
overlooks the fundamental differences between yield
capitalization and direct capitalization.

The capitalization

rate for yield capitalization is based directly on k, the cost of
capital, and therefore should be on the order of 15 percent.

The

capitalization rate for direct capitalization, on the other hand,
is based on price-earnings ratios taken from stock market data.
It is not based directly on the cost of capital.

18

Because there

For example, Dr. Schoenwald calculated an income
indicator of value for UP for 1984 of $2,198,981,000, based on
earnings of $338,643,000 and a capitalization rate of 15.4%.
See common ex. 30 & 33 at 89. Lowering the capitalization rate
just 1%, to 14.4%, increases the value of UP by almost 7%, to
$2,351,687,500.

18

is no direct relationship between the cost of capital and P/E or
E/P ratios, the fact that a direct cap rate or E/P ratio may be
less than the cost of capital (k) is of no moment*

Although

there was wide disagreement among the experts about the priceearnings ratios to be used and their importance in the process,
the evidence suggested that the state values were well within the
very broad range of possible ratios.

Thus, the plaintiffs'

argument has merit only if the state was required to use a yield
capitalization method as opposed to a direct capitalization
method in arriving at an approximation of value.

B.

Choice of Method

The parties do not disagree so much over the proper
application of each other's methodology as they do over the
choice of method in the first place.
Technically, methodology is not the issue in this case—
discrimination is.

But discrimination under the 4R Act must be

measured in terms of "true market value"—the congressionally
mandated measure—and one's conclusion as to true market value
depends on the path one takes to reach the conclusion.
One problem with subjecting complex issues like valuation to
judicial determination is that the court generally must choose
among the competing claims of experts.

19

Unless the court performs

its own appraisal—a task it is not inclined to undertake19—the
court must hold either for the plaintiff or the defendant, when
often the truth—or at least a more exact picture of reality—
lies somewhere in between.

The court, of course, may adjust an

expert's appraisal up or down based on other experts1 critiques
of the appraisal,20 but the starting point for judicial
determination is always one appraisal or another, and each
appraisal is based on a particular methodology that, to a large
extent, predetermines the result.

Thus, implicit in the court's

holding is a decision as to method.
For example, if the court were to hold for the plaintiff and
accept Dr. Schoenwald's valuations, it would in effect be saying
that Dr. Schoenwald's methodology produces the correct result,
and any methodology that produces a different result must be
wrong.

Given that hypothetical premise, it naturally follows

that, if the state must tax the plaintiffs in proportion to their
true market value, which it must under the 4R Act, then the state
should apply Dr. Schoenwald's methodology in valuing the

19

Were the court to undertake its own, independent
appraisal, its choice of methods would enjoy undue sanction, and
the application of its methods would be subject to many of the
same types of criticisms that the parties' appraisals are subject
to but without the same opportunity the parties have had to
critique each other's appraisals.
20

The court*s task is complicated by the fact that often,
as here, the experts themselves cannot always agree whether the
appraisals were properly performed or not.

20

railroads, since that is the only methodology that will
consistently produce the right result.21
Thus, although the plaintiffs argue that the court need not
dictate to the state a particular methodology, some choice of
methodology is inescapable.

The courts decision on valuation

must recognize (at least implicitly) one valuation method at the
expense of other methods. That in no sense determines that one
is right and the others are wrong.
The defendants suggest that the court should simply defer to
their current choice of methodology.

However, the plaintiffs

were initially assessed based on a methodology that even the
state now concedes was flawed.

The question, then, is whether

the state's new appraisals, based on a new methodology, are
entitled to the same deference.
The plaintiffs argue that they are not. 22

They argue that

the court should determine the valuation question based on which
method it finds the most reasonable.

They further contend that

Dr. Schoenwald's valuation method is more reasonable than the
state's, best reflects reality and leads to the actual or correct
true market value.
21

None of the experts in this case suggest that all roads
lead to Rome. Rather, the testimony was that two different
methods will produce the same result only by coincidence. As one
can see from appendix A, the varying methods the three sets of
appraisers used produced widely varying results.
22

The plaintiffs suggest that, if anything, the state
should have the burden of proving the validity of its new
appraisals. See infra note 29.

21

The evidence suggested that yield capitalization is
generally preferred to direct capitalization because it is
directly derived from basic value theory, is more sophisticated
than direct capitalization and generally produces a better
result.

However, the evidence also showed that both approaches

were widely used to value railroads and other properties.

The

question, then, is whether the state is free to choose among
accepted valuation methods or whether the 4R Act compels the use
of one particular method.
In the Burlington Northern case the Supreme Court expressly
left open the question "whether a railroad may, in an action
under [the 4R Act], challenge in the district court the
appropriateness of the accounting methods by which the State
determined the railroadfs value, or is instead restricted to
challenging the factual determinations to which the State's
preferred accounting methods were applied.11

Burlington N. R.R.

Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n. 107 S. Ct. 1855, 1861 n.5 (1987).
Although the question may be an open one, this court has found
nothing in the 4R Act itself or in its legislative history that
requires this court to make the state apply a particular
valuation methodology*
Indeed, the legislative history of the 4R Act suggests just
the opposite.

The committee report on Senate Bill 927, one of

several precursors to the 4R Act,23 stated that the bill
23

It is well settled that the legislative history of
precursors to a statute are relevant in construing the statute.
See Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Lennen. 573 F. Supp.
22

does not suggest or require a State to change its
assessment standards, assessment practices, or the
assessments themselves. It merely provides a single
standard against which all affected assessments must be
measured in order to determine their relationship to
each other. It is not a standard for determining
value; it is a standard to which values that have
already been determined must be compared.
S. Rep. No. 1483, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. app. B (1968), quoted in
Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. Lennen. 573 F. Supp.
1155, 1161 (D. Kan. 1982) (emphasis omitted), aff'd. 715 F.2d 494
(10th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 467 U.S. 1230-31 (1984).24
In subsequent legislative proposals Congress reaffirmed its
position that it did not intend to dictate state valuation
methods.

See Lennen, 573 F. Supp. at 1163-64. For example, in

hearings on House Bill 16245, another forerunner of the 4R Act,
Philip M. Lanier, a railroad representative, testified that the
bill "would not deal with valuation being standard.

The

standards and methods of valuation that any State wishes to use
would be totally unaffected by this legislation."

Hearing Before

the Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics of the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 16245, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 138 (1970), quoted in 573 F. Supp. at 1163
(emphasis omitted).

Thus, the legislative history suggests that

1155, 1160 n.5 (D. Kan. 1982), aff'd, 715 F.2d 494, 497 (10th
Cir. 1983), cert, denied. 467 U.S. 1230-31 (1984), and cases
cited therein.
24

The quoted passage from appendix B to Senate Report 1483
appears to have been taken from the testimony of James N. Ogden,
Vice-President and General Counsel of the Gulf Mobile and Ohio
Railroad Company, during hearings on Senate Bill 927. See
Burlington Northern, 573 F. Supp. at 1161-62.
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the statute was not meant to dictate a statefs choice of
methodology, at least as long as the methodology chosen had a
rational basis and was not chosen for a discriminatory purpose,25
The plaintiffs argue, however, that the statute itself
requires this court to choose the correct valuation method from
among the competing methods.

They argue that the statute

requires the court to determine their "true market value" and
that the only way the court can do that is by determining which
method gives the "true" true market value.

That method is the

one that is most reasonable and most accurate and hence arrives
at the most correct result.

They further argue that Dr.

Schoenwald's methodology and data are the most reasonable and
most accurate and can be applied most consistently and hence give
the best indication of true market value.
25

See Tr. at 1151-52.

To the extent Lennen concluded from the legislative
his ;ory that the whole valuation question was essentially off
limits to federal courts, see 573 F. Supp. at 1164 ("the issue of
the appropriate 'true market value1 of a railroad is generally
not to be an issue in a Section 306 case"), it has since been
overruled. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commfnr
107 S. Ct. 1855 (1987). However, this court agrees with Judge
Rogers's conclusion "that Congress did not intend "for the federal
courts to become involved in establishing . . . procedures for
the states in the valuing of railroads." 573 F. Supp. at 1164.
It is one thing to say that the 4R Act allows federal courts to
review railroads1 claims of overvaluation. It is quite another
to say that the Act dictates a state1s choice of valuation
methods. The 4R Act may provide relief if a state overvalues a
railroad by misapplying its chosen methodology or by using a
methodology that has no rational basis or is chosen for the
purpose of overvaluing railroads. See, e.g.. Burlington N., 107
S. Ct. at 1859 (the railroad's only claim of discriminatory
taxation was that the state had misapplied its own valuation
methodology). But, this court believes, the Act does not
necessarily provide relief just because the state's chosen
methodology results in higher values than some other method the
state could have chosen.

24

The court declines the plaintiffs1 invitation to adopt Dr.
Schoenwald's methodology as the only correct methodology for
determining true market value.
Each expert asserts that his methodology results in a value
that most closely corresponds to reality.

However, absent a

willing buyer and a willing seller, there is no absolute way to
test the assertions of competing valuations or competing claims
of correspondence to "true market value," if such a thing exists
in the order of things.
From the beginning of this case, the court was willing to
assume that there was such a thing as "true market value" that
could be determined objectively from evidence much the same way a
court can determine a wrongfully discharged employee's back wages
from evidence.

See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n. 635

F. Supp. 1060, 1067 at n.10 (D. Utah 1986).

Indeed, the

approach of nhe 4R Act presupposes that, like Plato1s ideal,
there is in fact a "true market value," that it exists, that it
can be pointed to, pictured, recognized and can be used as the
standard against which valuation figures may be compared.
Success in valuation would be indicated by the correspondence of
the valuation figures with the ideal.
From the six weeks of testimony in this case, however,
certain things became apparent.
a science.

First, valuation is an art, not

It is a function of judgment, not of natural law.

Try as it might, even Congress is incapable of enacting either a
natural law of the market or Platofs ideal.

25

"True market value,"

then, must needs mean something else. Absent a miracle of time,
place and circumstance—willing buyer, willing seller, high noon,
January 1, 1984, for example—true market value for purposes of
ad valorem taxation is always an estimate, always an expression
of judgment, always a result built on a foundation of
suppositions about knowledgeable and willing buyers and sellers
endowed with money and desire, whose desires are said to converge
in a dollar description of the asset. All of this is simply a
sophisticated effort at "letfs pretend11 or "modeling," in modern
jargon, and all of it involves judgment.

Not natural law, not

science—judgment.
The appraisals in this case generally contain two or three
estimates of value, which, within the same appraisal, may vary by
as much as 100 percent or more.
75 & 83; see also appendix A.

See, e.g., common ex. 30 & 3 at

Thus, the same appraiser may come

to vastly different conclusions as to the value of the same
railroad for the same assessment date, depending on the method he
uses.

Moreover, each method requires various estimates and

calculations, small variations in any of which may lead to large
differences in value.

See, e.g.. supra note 18. Absent evidence

of an actual sale, the term "true market value" is at best a
rational fiction.

Conclusions as to true market value are based

on each appraisers best judgment, and each appraiser approaches
the task of valuation a little differently, with his own
assumptions and theories as to what mythical buyers and sellers
consider (or should consider) in arriving at an agreed-on price.

26

Perhaps Clifford Fitzgerald, a corporate finance expert who
testified on behalf of the plaintiffs, said it best:
not one universal concept of value*" Tr. at 2096.
fl

any one perfectly correct method."

"There is

Nor is there

Ifl. at 2110-11. See also

id. at 1718 (testimony of Mr. Voytko that there is no standard
approach to value).
Mr. Goodwin described Dr. Schoenwald's methodology as
"assumption driven."

The epithet was apparently meant

disparagingly and was contrasted with his own methods, which, he
claimed, were "market driven."

In truth, however, each

appraiser's methodology is assumption driven.26

The assumption

may be r equals k or that growth is constant, or the assumption
may be that the price of a companyfs stock is the best indicator
of the value of its assets.

(Presumably that is what Mr. Goodwin

meant when he said his model was "market driven.")

The latter

assumption, of course, may oversimplify matters by not.accounting
for the effect of other variables on the stock market—economic
and otherwise (perhaps even including the conference of the Super
Bowl winner).

See, e.g.. Tr. at 1337-39, 1421 (testimony of Dr.

Ifflander that stock market prices do not always accurately
reflect value); id. at 1507-10 (Dr. Pettit's attempt to explain

26

The court is reminded of the old story of the economist
marooned with a companion on a desert island. A can of food
washed up on the beach. The economists starving companion asked
him how they could open the can, to which the economist blithely
replied, "Assume a can opener."

27

the stock market crash of 1987 based on various factors unrelated
to a company's true market value). 27
From all the evidence presented it is clear that there is
more than one way to value a railroad.
2110-11.

See, e.g., Tr. at 1718,

Each method may represent what some buyers and sellers

actually do. 28

All the methods may be equally rational given

their underlying assumptions. And they are all irrational if
pressed to extremes.

For example, using the income approach, one

would be forced to conclude that a company with a net loss for
the year or over a period of years actually had a negative value
— a skewed and discordant picture of reality.
2201-03.

See, e.g.. Tr. at

Or, using the stock and debt approach, one might be

forced to conclude that over 20 percent of the value of a company
evaporated in the few short hours between the opening and closing
of the New York Stock Exchange on October 19, 1987, despite the
fact that the company's functioning assets remained virtually
unchanged over that period.

Each method or theory depends on

certain assumptions that cannot ultimately be proved or disproved
by reason alone nor replicated in experience.

Thus, this court

cannot say that any one method is necessarily more rational than
27

The vagaries of the stock market once prompted a member
of the Council of Economic Advisors to suggest that market
behavior could be explained not so much by market analysis but by
psychoanalysis.
28

Indeed, perhaps the best evidence of the railroads' true
market value is not any single appraisal but, assuming that each
appraiser has performed his work accurately and in good faith,
the average of all the appraisers1 judgments concerning true
market value.

28

any other.

Nor can the court say that one method alone arrives

at the railroadfs "true market value."

Rather, the evidence

suggests that the term "true market value" "is a judgment not
subject to mathematical precision that is based on a wide variety
of factors" and

f,

is at best an approximation."

Rio Alaom Corp.

v, San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, 192 (Utah 1984).

From all the

evidence in this case, the court cannot say that the state's
judgment as to the plaintiffs' true market value is wrong.29
The state suggests that its methods have the advantage that
they are used consistently to value all centrally assessed
property, so if the method produces any error in valuations, the
effect is not to discriminate against the railroad.

Presumably,

if application of the same method overvalues or undervalues all
commercial and industrial property in the state equally, there is
no discrimination against railroads.

However, the state concedes

^
In a 4R Act case "the burden of proof with respect to
the determination of assessed value and true market value shall
be that declared by the applicable State law." Pub. L. No. 94210, § 306(2)(d), 90 Stat, at 55 (1976). The plaintiffs argue
that the burden of proof should be on the state to prove its
assessment is correct. They cite the court to no authority for
this proposition. Rather, they argue that, under Utah law, once
it is shown that a state's assessment is wrong, the burden shifts
to the state to prove that its new assessment is correct, and,
they note, the state has already admitted its original
assessments were wrong. But see Utah Power & Light Co. v. Utah
State Tax Comn^n. 590 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1979) (if the taxpayer
claims error in a proceeding before the tax commission, "it has
an obligation, not only to show substantial error or impropriety
in the assessment, but also to provide a sound evidentiary basis
upon which the Commission could adopt a lower valuation")
(citations omitted). Even assuming that the plaintiffs' argument
is correct, given the court's decision that the state was free to
adopt the method of its choice, the court concludes that the
state has met the burden of proving the correctness of its new
assessments by a preponderance of the evidence.
29

that it did not treat all centrally assessed property equally for
the assessment years in question.

For 1984 and 1985 it assessed

all centrally assessed property using its discarded methodology.
If one of the 350 centrally assessed property owners appealed,
the state prepared a new assessment based on its new methodology,
as it did in this case. Thus, the state did not treat all
centrally assessed property equally in 1984 and 1985.
Moreover, even if the state did treat all centrally assessed
property equally (as it claims to do now), it may still have
violated the 4R Act if its uniform method has the effect of
overvaluing railroads.

It is no defense under the 4R Act "to

say that the state may also be discriminating against . . . other
companies.ff

Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Louisiana Tax

Comm'n. 498 F. Supp. 418, 422 (M.D. La. 1980). 30
Nevertheless, the statefs argument may have some force.
If the court were to require the state to use Dr. Schoenvaid's
valuation methods, the state would have to apply the methods to
30

Although it may not be a defense to say that all
centrally assessed properties are overvalued as a result of the
state's choice of methodology, if in fact they are it is likely
that together all the owners of centrally assessed property will
have sufficient political power to force the state to change its
valuation methods. After all, it is not every property owner
that can achieve beneficial legislation such as the 4R Act. As
Auberon Herbert once observed: "It is the small owner who offers
the only really profitable and reliable material for taxation.
. . . He is made for taxation. . . . [H]e has less skill, and
ingenuity as regards escape; and he still has a large supply of
'ignorant patience of taxation.1 If Quoted in F. Coffield, &
Popular History of Taxationf quoted in A Dictionary of Legal
Quotations 165 (S. James & C. Stebbings comp. 1987). The court,
however, does not base its conclusions as to discrimination on
the state's relative treatment of centrally assessed properties
but on its conclusion as to the railroads' true market value.
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all centrally assessed property so that the discriminatory effect
of the statefs valuations could be properly measured.

The court

has found no evidence that Congress intended the 4R Act to
dictate how a state must value nonrailroad property.

If, as it

appears from the record, all centrally assessed properties are
now appraised using the methods the state used in its current
appraisals of the plaintiff railroads, that may be reason to give
those appraisals greater weight.
But the court believes that it should not disturb the
state's choice of methodology for other reasons as well.

From

the testimony of the state's witnesses, the court concludes that
the state's appraisers sincerely seek to arrive at what they
consider to be the railroads' true market value and that, to that
end, they constantly reevaluate their methods and change them
when they become convinced that they are wrong.31
31

The state's

Indeed, of all the appraisers in this case, the court
was most impressed with the credibility of the state appraiser,
Mr. Prawitt, and of his supervisor, Mr. Monson. Of all the
appraisers, Mr. Prawitt seemed the only one who was not out to
achieve a particular, predetermined result. Indeed, he testified
that he prepared his appraisals without even looking at the
state's earlier appraisals so that the earlier appraisals would
not affect his conclusions. The other experts all had a theory
to defend, which colored their choice of data and methods. Each
appraisal required the appraisers to make numerous judgments, but
the other appraisers often seemed to base their judgments on the
end result, using a technique or methodology if it tended to
support the desired result and changing it when convenient. For
example, the plaintiffs criticized the state's witnesses for
using average P/Es, arguing that a mechanical computation of
averages ignored the factors that went into an informed judgment.
See, e.g., Tr. at 1661-63. Yet they then turned around and
argued that their true market value should be determined by
mechanically computing the average of Dr. Schoenwald's income and
stock and debt indicators of value (ignoring the cost indicator
altogether), when the disparity between Dr. Schoenwald's income

31

witnesses also testified that appraisal methods and philosophy
are continually changing, presumably for the better, and that
they try to keep current on new developments in the field without
regard for the source, that is, whether the developments be from
other state appraisers or from industry experts. Were this court
to conclude that the 4R Act codified the Schoenwald method of
valuation, it would prevent states from critically examining
their appraisal methods and would discourage them from adopting
new and better methods as they become accepted by the appraisal
profession.
For all of these reasons, the court concludes that the 4R
Act no more enacts the Schoenwald method of valuation than the
fourteenth amendment enacts Herbert Spencerfs "Social Statics.ff
Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
All parties must remember that the purpose of producing a
figure as to value, whether we label it "fair cash value" or
"true market value," is to provide a figure against which one may
then apply the tax percentage to arrive at what is due and owing
by the taxpayer to the taxing unit.

If one has a choice of

methods and chooses a method with a rational footing and is
consistent and evenhanded in applying the method to all

and stock-and-debt indicators was so great as to make one or the
other suspect without even comparing Dr. Schoenwaldfs figures
with the other appraisers1. See, e.g., Tr. at 1511. None of the
appraisers may have been perfectly consistent, but Mr. Prawitt
seemed most concerned with discovering an objective value and
least committed to a particular theory or methodology.
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comparable properties, then conceptually the end result should be
payment by taxpayers of a tax bill that is not disproportionate
to the like payments of all other comparable taxpayers*

The

court holds that, as long as the state's methodology has a
rational basis and was not chosen for a discriminatory purpose,
the court will not disturb that choice.

The court concludes from

all the evidence that the state's methodology has a rational
basis and was not chosen with the intent of overvaluing
railroads.

Thus, it will not second-guess the state's choice of

method.
Even if the court were forced to choose among the competing
methodologies, the court believes that the state's methodology
has much to commend it.

Not only does the state consistently

use essentially the same approach for all centrally assessed
property, but alr;o its approach is based on historical data and
market data readr.ly available both to investors and to the
state.32

Moreover, it is easy to apply—an important

consideration given the state's limited resources and the
tremendous time pressures under which the state's appraisals must
be prepared.

See, e.g.. Tr. at 339 & 402.

For example, although

a yield capitalization model is more elegant and might be
preferred to a direct capitalization model, Mr. Fitzgerald, one
32

For example, unlike Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflander, who
place much weight—possibly too much—on the company's
projections for the coming year, gleaned in part from internal
company documents not available to the public generally, the
state uses the weighted average of the five previous years'
income to determine the railroad's projected income in its income
approach.
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of the plaintiffs1 experts, testified that it took him two and
one-half years, working full time, to value seven railroads, an
average of over four months for each.

See id. at 2068.

state simply does not have that luxury.

The

Given its time

constraints, it may legitimately choose an approach that is
easier to apply than a more precise but more complex model.
In many respects, the statefs methodology is closer to Dr.
Schoenwald1s than is Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflanderfs.

For

example, both the state and Dr. Schoenwald use a five-year
average of NROI as the basis for their income calculations,
whereas Mr. Goodwin and Dr. Ifflander use projections based on
strategic plans known more for their inspirational value than for
their prediction value and on a form of regression analysis
discredited by the plaintiffs' statistical expert.

Both the

state and Dr. Schoenwald use the full debt rate in determining
the cost of debt, whereas Mr. Goodwin and Dr. Ifflander use what
they call current yield.

Both the state and Dr. Schoenwald treat

current assets and current liabilities in their stock-and-debt
approach; Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflander do not.

Both the state

and Dr. Schoenwald allocate both debt and equity to the railroad.
Mr. Goodwin and Dr. Ifflander allocate only equity.

And in the

cost approach both the state and Dr. Schoenwald purport to
measure obsolescence based on the entire railroad industry; the
other appraisers do not.

See generally id. at 1898-1913 (Dr.

Schoenwaldfs summary of the basic differences among the three
approaches).

34

Even if the court were inclined to require the state to
apply yield capitalization rather than direct capitalization,
however, the court would not require it to apply the Schoenwald
method of yield capitalization (that is, the expansion model).
The Schoenwald method is based on a critical assumption, namely,
that r equals k.

The assumption is problematic at best.

It was

debated at length during the course of the trial. Needless to
say, there was no consensus among the experts (who included
several Ph.Ds in finance) about the reasonableness of the
assumption.

The experts vigorously disputed the issue,

predictably aligning themselves according to the party on whose
behalf they were called to testify.33

Without deciding the

33

The opinions of some of the experts as to whether or not
r is greater than k appeared to depend to some extent on their
opinion about the prospects of the railroad industry. At times
it seemed the experts were testifying about two different
industries. In Dr. Schoenwaldfs view, the railroads have been in
decline since at least the 1920s a:id can never expect to earn a
rate of return even equal to the cost of capital. In fact, it is
a wonder that they are still in business. On the other hand, in
the opinion of Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflander the Staggers Act,
which was passed in 1980, ushered in a new Golden Age of
railroading.
Perhaps there is more than one railroad industry. At least
the railroad industry of the late 1800s was a far different
industry from the railroad industry of the mid-1900s. Thus,
Chesterton could write:
[W]hen I was a boy, which was just before the motor-car
burst upon the world, I never dreamed of doubting that
the railway-train dominated the whole future of the
world. It was the latest great locomotive that man had
invented. . . . To talk, as some people are now
talking, of whether railways will become obsolete, or
whether steam can be superseded, of whether railway
stock will always be as safe as it was—all this would
have been to me a prophecy as unintelligible as some of
those Old Testament visions that seem a medley of
wheels and wings and clouds. Railways had been firmly
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reasonableness of the assumption, the court can at least say that
the assumption would appear to be less than self-evident and not
whole-heartedly accepted in the finance community, judging from
the expert testimony.
Dr. Schoenwald attempted to prove the validity of his
assumption by showing that historically the railroads have failed
to earn a return commensurate with the cost of capital. See
pltffs* ex. 95(a).

In exhibit 95(a) Dr. Schoenwald calculated a

value for UP using his expansion model based on UPfs average NROI
for the period 1950-54. Using his expansion model, he valued the
railroad at $581,514,000.

He then did a more traditional yield

capitalization analysis for the period 1955-84, discounting the
actual net cash flows for those years based on the actual
discount rates and adding a terminal value based on the average
NROI for the period 1980-84, and concluded that the actual total

established before I was born; I never dreamed of
doubting that they would remain exactly the same after
I died.
G.K. Chesterton, Come to Think of It . . . 16-17 (1931). Yet
the railroads did change. Chesterton lived to see their economic
power decline. Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflander would have the
court believe that if Chesterton had lived another fifty years he
would have seen the rebirth of the railroad industry. The
railroads1 experts, on the other hand, talk as though the
railroads will never recover. But if they've changed once, they
may change again.
There was testimony that the railroad industry is a cyclical
industry. According to Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflander, the
industry has come full circle. Perhaps only time will tell
whether or not they are right. In any event, the court does not
have to choose between the competing prognostications. The
market makes its own choice. And the state's valuation methods,
based on the market as they are, should reflect the market's
outlook.
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market value of the railroad's net cash flows from 1955 into
perpetuity was only $247,504,000. Thus, he concluded, his model
actually overvalued UP by more than double, showing the r did not
even equal k for UP over the last thirty years.
Mister Goodwin and Doctors Ifflander and Pettit criticized
Dr. Schoenwald for using actual, historical figures. They argued
that the value of the railroad as of January 1, 1955, depended on
what investors would have been willing to pay for it, which in
turn would have depended on their expectations.

They further

argue that no one could have accurately predicted the actual
numbers, which Dr. Schoenwald uses.

Implicit in their argument

is that investors are overly optimistic and would have projected
much higher cash flows and lower discount rates than actually
occurred.

All Dr. Schoenwald tried to show was that, had the

investors had perfect foresight and applied his model, they still
would have overvalued the railroad.

From this he concludes that

his assumption that r equals k is a generous assumption.
Nevertheless, it appears to the courtfs untrained eye that
exhibit 95(a) is flawed.

It suffers from one of those classic

"mismatches" that Dr. Schoenwald is fond of talking about. Dr.
Schoenwaldfs expansion value is based on a discounted average
NROI, yet the yield capitalization approach he compares it to is
based on discounted net cash flows.

It is apparent from exhibit

95(a) that NROI is substantially higher than net cash flows,
especially for the early years of the study.

For example, for

the period 1955-59, the first five-year period for which
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complete data are available, the average NROI is over four times
greater than the average net cash flow.

Of course, under Dr.

Schoenwald1s expansion model, a higher NROI translates into a
proportionately higher final value.

Thus, by using NROI for the

period 1950-54 to value the railroad, Dr. Schoenwald arrives at a
higher value than he would have reached had he used net cash
flows for the same period.

In other words, Dr. Schoenwald

concludes that his model overvalues the railroad based on a
comparison of an expansion value derived from high NROIs to a
yield capitalization value derived from relatively low net cash
flows.
Had Dr. Schoenwald compared values that were both based on
net cash flows or both based on NROI, he may have reached very
different results.

For example, if one were to estimate the

average net cash flow for the period 1950-54 by dividing NROI
(Dr. Schoenwald1s capitalized income stream) by four, it would
reduce his expansion value accordingly and might turn out that
his model actually undervalued the railroad significantly.
Unfortunately, exhibit 95(a) omits all the data the court needs
to make the proper comparison.

At best, however, the court

concludes that exhibit 95(a) only supports Dr. Schoenwaldfs
second assumption—that NROI is a generous estimate of net cash
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flow 34 —and not his primary assumption, namely that r is no
greater than k.
Dr. Schoenwald also tried to prove his assumption that r is
no greater than k by calculating expected growth rates and
comparing them to the expected growth that the investment
publication Value Line, the defendants1 Bible, projected for the
same time period.

Using the basic formula that growth (g) equals

retained earnings (b) times the rate of return (r) and using the
ICC's cost of capital for the rate of return (based on his
assumption that r equals k), Dr. Schoenwald concluded that not
even Value Line expected the railroads to grow at even an
expansionary growth rate.

See Tr. at 2059-64; 2117-19; pltffs1

exs. 464 & 465. However, Dr. Ifflander testified that the
calculated growth rate (b X r) showed growth in earnings, and if
one used return on equity (ROE) for r and compared the calculated
growth rate with Value Line's projected growth rate for earnings,
the railroads as a whole were projected to grow at a rate faster

34

In fact, exhibit 95(a) casts doubt on Dr. Schoenwald's
second assumption as well. Dr. Schoenwald justified his use of
NROI as opposed to net cash flow on the grounds that NROI is a
"generous." estimate of net cash flow. However, at least for the
years from 1980 to 1984, the years that Dr. Schoenwald averaged
for his 1985 income estimate, net cash flow was greater than NROI
for UP, despite a negative net cash flow for 1980.
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than Dr. Schoenwaldfs expansionary model allows for.35

See Tr.

at 2230-32; defs1 ex. 236.
Rather than assuming that r equals k, the state lets the
market decide the values of r and k.

Implicit in the market

price of a security are the market participants1 determinations
of the alphabet soup of economic variables for the company—r, k,
g and b.

It appears that at least some investors believed that r

would be greater than k for the plaintiff railroads during the
assessment years.

See, e.g., Tr. at 1504-06; interveners' ex. 8.

Philip Anschutz bought the D&RG (or, more precisely, its holding
company, Rio Grande Industries) in 1984, one of the assessment
years, and in fact paid a premium for the company's stock,36
suggesting that he viewed the railroad as a good investment that
could return a rate greater than the cost of capital.37
35

Even Dr. Ifflander conceded that, no matter how one
compares projections with implied growth rates, the D&RG was not
expected to achieve even expansionary growth for 1984. So the
assumption that r is no greater than k may have been true for the
D&RG for 1984.
36

The plaintiffs suggest that the stock market may not be
the best indicator of a railroadfs value. Given that Dr.
Schoenwald's stock-and-debt approach consistently valued the
plaintiffs higher than his income approach and that Mr. Anschutz
was willing to pay a premium over the company's stock market
price, the plaintiffs may be right. The stock market may
undervalue railroads.
37

The plaintiffs point out that both Union Pacific and
Southern Pacific also had the opportunity to buy the D&RG but
turned it down. Of course, the fact that some investors or
potential buyers may see the value of a company differently than
others does not necessarily mean that there is no market for the
company or that it is overvalued. In fact, differences of
opinion as to value are what make for a market in the first
place.
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Assuming for the moment that Dr. Schoenwald's conclusion as
to historical facts is correct, that does not necessarily mean
that his model correctly values the railroad.

Looking at

history, the willing seller may conclude that r is no greater
than k.

Indeed, that may be why he wants to sell—because he

cannot earn even his cost of capital.

Nevertheless, regardless

of past performance, it seems somewhat counterintuitive to
suggest that in valuing a prospective investment willing buyers
assume that they will not be able to earn a return at least equal
to their cost of capital.

Otherwise, one would think that they

would look elsewhere to invest their money.

Since the elusive

true market value depends on both a willing buyer and a willing
seller, the assumption that r is no greater than k may at best be
half true, and, as Justice Frankfurter used to observe, a halftruth is often a whole lie.

See P. Elman, Response, 100 Harv. L.

Rev. 1949, 1952 (1987).
The court does not have to decide the reasonableness of the
assumption, however, because the Schoenwald valuation method
suffers from a more serious defect.

There is no evidence that

those in the business of valuing railroads for buyers and sellers
actually use Dr. Schoenwald's expansion model.38
38

For example,

Mr. Fitzgerald of First Boston Corporation testified
that in his yield capitalization method he uses a method similar
to Dr. Schoenwald's to arrive at a terminal value, that is, a
value for the cash flows after the last year of his analysis.
However, his basic analysis is the traditional yield
capitalization approach, similar to Messieurs Goodwin and
Ifflander's, by which he forecasts future cash flows for a period
of time—in his case, over a ten-year period. The terminal value
in such an approach is only a small fraction of the total value.
41

when the board of directors of Rio Grande Industries (the
holding company for D&RG) was deciding whether to accept Mr.
Anschutz's offer to buy the company, it did not ask Dr.
Schoenwald to value the railroad.

Rather, it commissioned a

study by the investment firm of Morgan Stanley, and Morgan
Stanley did not value the railroad using Dr. Schoenwaldfs
expansion model.

See Tr. at 1241; defs' ex. 155.

Its study used

a discounted cash flow model similar to the method Messieurs
Goodwin and Ifflander used in the 1984 appraisal of UP and also,
as a check, applied various price multiples in a fashion similar
to the state's appraisal and, incidentally, with results closer
to the state's appraisal than to Dr. Schoenwald's.39
On the other hand, it is undisputed that the state's methods
are used by other professional appraisers and by market analysts.
See, e.g.. Tr. at 1682 (testimony of Mr. Voytko that P/E ratios
are widely used by security analysts).

Dr. Schoenwald himself

used price-earnings multiples to value the nonrailroad
subsidiaries of the railroad holding companies in his stock-and-

39

Morgan Stanley concluded that the railroad's equity
value was roughly $280 million. See defs' ex. 155 at ex. 1, p.
1. When the debt value is added to the equity value, the value
becomes approximately $360 million, see Tr. at 1176, compared to
the state's estimated value of about $389 million for the
railroad's stock and debt. See common ex. 41 at S-l. To the
stock and debt value must be added another $6 million or so for
operating leases to arrive at a total stock and debt indicator of
value. In comparison, Dr. Schoenwald's total value for the
railroad for the same assessment year was less than $280 million.
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debt approach.40

The statefs direct capitalization approach may

not be the preferred approach of the more sophisticated analysts,
but at least analysts generally use price-earnings multiples as a
check on their yield capitalization results. Moreover, the ICC
used a direct capitalization method in analyzing the offers of
competing railroads1 to buy the core lines of the Milwaukee
Railroad and concluded that, of the three methods it used to
evaluate the offers, "the price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio is a more
reliable basis to make an evaluation, since it is less
susceptible to outside influences or to speculative
considerations."

Defs' ex. 17 at 54; see also Tr. at 560-63.

The ICC also used a direct capitalization approach when it
decided the question of compensation for the trackage rights the
D&RG was awarded as a result of the Union Pacific—Missouri
Pacific merger.

See defs1 ex. 18 at 4.

Perhaps most telling,

the D&RG itself argued that the interest rental portion of the
compensation should be calculated using a price-earnings
multiple, id. at 7, and UP agreed, i£. at 8.

Thus, the

plaintiffs themselves have used a form of direct capitalization
to determine value.
The plaintiffs argue that the state's appraisals are flawed
40

If the use of price-earnings multiples in fact
overvalues properties, as Dr. Schoenwald suggested in critiquing
the appraisals of Messieurs Goodwin, Ifflander and Prawitt, then
Dr. Schoenwald overvalued the holding companies1 nonrailroad
subsidiaries, and, under his stock-and-debt methodology, any
overvaluation of the nonrailroad subsidiaries attributable to Dr.
Schoenwald's use of price-earnings ratios would produce a
commensurate undervaluation of the railroad. See infra pp. 4445.
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because the state looks to the stock market for both its income
and its stock and debt approaches.

Because both approaches

depend on the same source, they argue, they cannot produce
independent and hence accurate results.

Dr. Schoenwald's income

approach has an advantage over the statefs, they suggest, in that
it does not depend on market data for its conclusions.

Thus, it

provides an independent indicator to compare to the stock-anddebt indicator of value and is therefore the better method.
Of course, nothing in the 4R Act requires a state to use
three separate and independent indicators of value.

Dr.

Schoenwald himself uses at most only two indicators of value.
See supra note 10. 41

The fact that the state looks to the stock

market for the data for two of its approaches does not mean that
its appraisals are flawed.

Rather, it merely reflects the

state's underlying assumption, namely, that the stock market is
the best indicator of a company's value.

Given all the

evidence, the court cannot say that that assumption is any less
reasonable than Dr. Schoenwaldfs—namely, that r equals k. 42
Consequently, the court believes that the state's income
indicator of value is a proper estimate of true market value.
While the choice between the parties1 income approaches may
present a choice between equally reasonable alternatives, the
41

In fact, for his 1985 appraisal of D&RG, Dr. Schoenwald
used only one indicator. See appendix A, p. 67 n.2.
42

The state's assumption was even supported by one of the
plaintiffs' own witnesses. See Tr. at 1717 (testimony of James
Voytko).
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court believes that the defendants1 stock-and-debt approach is
more reasonable than Dr. Schoenwald's and arrives at a more
accurate indicator of value.

Dr. Schoenwald assumes that the

value of the railroad is whatever is left over after valuing the
other components of the holding company.

While that assumption

is theoretically sound, as the state1s experts pointed out, it
makes the railroad bear the burden of any measurement errors. A
number of small errors valuing the other properties would create
a large error in the value of the railroad.

For example, Dr.

Ifflander suggested that Dr. Schoenwald may have overvalued
Champlin Petroleum, a subsidiary of Union Pacific Corporation,
the holding company, by as much as a billion dollars.

Using the

Schoenwald method, that error alone would translate into a
billion dollar error in the railroad's value.

The plaintiffs1

own witness, Mr. Fitzgerald, called Dr. Schoenwald's stock-anddebt method "a discredited activity which I place very little
judgment on," Tr. at 2104, one which could result in "a cascade
of capricious error" in the railroad's value, id. at 2106. The
court believes that the state's allocation method arrives at a
more accurate figure by allocating not only the stock price but
also the risk of error.
In short, the court concludes that the plaintiffs have not
shown that Dr. Schoenwald's methodology produces a better
result.

There is thus no reason to disturb the state's choice of

method.
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c.

The Statefs Valuation

Ordinarily, the court's conclusion in part I-B that the
state's valuation methods are reasonable and acceptable would end
the dispute.

The railroads could appeal any alleged error in

applying the state's methods to the state tax commission.

Once

the tax commission (and the state courts if necessary) had
corrected any errors in applying the method, this court could
then simply plug the state's final valuation figure into the
equation and determine whether the 4R Act had been violated.
However, because the state in this case relies on appraisals that
were newly prepared for this proceeding, the plaintiffs have not
had a chance to challenge the application of the state's chosen
methods before the tax commission.

Therefore, the court will

consider the plaintiffs' xaajor claims of error in the state's
application of its methods.
The plaintiffs first claim the state erred in applying its
direct capitalization method under its income approach.

The

state's direct capitalization rates or earnings-price ratios are
not simply the E/Ps for the subject companies but are composites
for the railroad industry derived from comparing the E/Ps and
other financial data of a number of railroads.

Everyone agrees

that, to be useful, the companies compared must in fact be
comparable to the subject railroad.

The parties dispute which

other railroads are truly comparable to UP and D&RG.

The

plaintiffs claim that there are no true comparables.

That is
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just another way of arguing that the state should not have used a
direct capitalization approach in valuing the railroads*

For the

reasons discussed in part I-B, the court concludes that the
state's approach is acceptable.

There may be no perfect

comparable, but the evidence suggests that that fact does not
prevent appraisers and other analysts from comparing railroads
and valuing them based on their comparisons. The statefs
approach has an advantage over Mr. Goodwin's and Dr. Ifflander's
in that it at least tries to select the most comparable companies
and eliminates the so-called outliers. The state has offered
plausible reasons for its choice of comparables. Moreover, at
least in the case of the UP for assessment year 1984, the
state's choice coincides with those companies Mr. Voytko, the
plaintiffs' witness, said he considered the most comparable.
Compare Tr. at 1655-61 (Mr. Voytko's testimony), with common ex.
32 at S/2.

In the ultimate analysis, the choice of comparables

is a judgment call by the particular appraiser.

This court

cannot say that the railroads the state chose are not comparable
or even that they are not the most comparable.

It therefore

declines to disturb the state's choices.
The plaintiffs next argue that the state erred by applying
its E/P ratios to the wrong earnings figure.

It claims that the

state has created a mismatch by using a current E/P and applying
it to projected earnings. The court concludes that the mismatch,
if any, is insignificant.
The state bases its E/Ps on Value Line's so-called trailing
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P/Es, which in turn relate a current price to the last twelve
months' earnings.

See Tr. at 956; defs' ex. 28 at B/2. Thus,

trailing P/Es are based on historical data.43

The state applies

this trailing ratio to an earnings figure that, although a
projection, is also based on historical data.44

Although the two

historical periods do not correspond completely, because the
state weights the earnings figures to arrive at its five-year
average, the earnings for the last twelve months receive the
43

Messieurs Goodwin and Ifflander, on the other hand, use
Value Line's "straddle" P/Es. The straddle P/E is based on the
last one or two quarters' actual earnings and two or three
quarters of projected earnings. The court believes that the use
of trailing ratios produces a more objective and hence better
result.
44

The state's projections, like Dr. Schoenwald•s, are
backwards looking in that they project future income based on
past performance. The primary difference between the two is that
the state weights previous years' NROI so as to put greater
emphasis on more recent history.
The state also adjusts previous years1 figures for inflation
so that all the figures are in current dollers. The plaintiffs
argue that such an adjustment is improper absent any evidence
that inflation actually benefits rail assets, and, they claim, it
does not. However, the state's inflation adjustment is not meant
to indicate the effect of inflation on the assets but merely to
enable the appraiser to look at history in terms of constant
dollars. It may be, as Dr. Schoenwald suggests, that any
adjustment for inflation is improper since the question is not
buying power but actual, normalized earnings. The court cannot
say from the evidence, however, that inflation has no positive
effect on rail transportation property, and any error in the
state's adjustment is partially offset by its weighting process,
in which revenues from the oldest years (those most influenced by
inflation) receive the least weight. Had the state based its
projections on a straight five-year average, as Dr. Schoenwald
did, instead of a weighted five-year average adjusted for
inflation, its income figures would have been higher, resulting
in higher overall values. Thus, any error in the state's use of
an inflation factor is more than offset by its allegedly improper
use of a weighted average.
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greatest weight.

Because those earnings relate directly to the

trailing ratio, there is a match, though perhaps an imperfect
match.

The price is at least roughly matched to the earnings

that produced it.
The state's approach tries to establish a relationship
between price and earnings based on so-called normalized data,
that is, data that reflects historical trends, at the same time
minimizing the effect of anomalous data.

It does this by a five-

year weighted average of earnings and by using an E/P derived
from the industry and not merely from the subject railroad.

It

is, in effect, not the E/P for any one railroad but for a
hypothetical, composite railroad.

The court does not believe

that Dr. Schoenwald's proposed alternatives would necessarily
produce a better result.

For example, to increase the E/P, as

Dr. Schoenwald does, see, e.g.. pltffs' ex. 475, based on a
projected "ircrease" in earnings (which is really just a
normalized earning figure) in effect begs the question by
assuming what effect such an increase in earnings will have on
price (namely, none).

Similarly, to apply the trailing E/P to

actual earnings for the year, as Dr. Schoenwald also does, see,
e.g.. pltffs1 ex. 476, does not establish the relationship
between price and projected income and may produce a skewed
result if the earnings for that particular year were atypical for
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any reason, for example, because of unusual capital expenditures
undertaken during the year.45
The plaintiffs next argue that the state appraisals err in
their treatment of intracompany debt in the stock-and-debt
approach because the stock market does not look at intracompany
debt in valuing a company.

However, Mr. Prawitt testified that

he prepared his stock-and-debt analysis based on the railroad's
balance sheet and that debts among the railroad and affiliated
entities in effect offset each other on the balance sheet.

The

court believes there was nothing improper about the state's
treatment of intracompany debt.
The court has considered the plaintiffs1 other criticisms of
the state appraisals and has rejected them.46

In short, the

court accepts the state appraisals prepared by Mr. Prawitt as the
best evidence of the plaintiffs' true market value as of the
assessment dates.

45 rphg plaintiffs might argue that if the earnings for the
year were atypical, the price-earnings ratio should also be
atypical and applying the actual P/E to the actual earnings will
still produce a correct result. However, the E/P that the state
applies is not the E/P for any particular company but supposedly
an E/P for the industry. An atypical year for one railroad may
not have much effect on the industry E/P, and applying that E/P
to abnormal earnings may produce an abnormal result.
46

The court's conclusion is not meant in any way to
preclude the plaintiffs from challenging the state's application
of its chosen methodology for other assessment years, through
the appropriate state procedures.
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D.

Conclusions

The court holds that, for purposes of applying the 4R Act
to the state's assessments of the plaintiff railroads, the true
market value of the plaintiffs for the assessment years in
question was as follows:
1984

1985

UP

$3.7 billion

$3.4 billion

D&RG

$320 million

$320 million

The court finds that the portion of the railroads1 true
market value that should be allocated to Utah for the assessment
years is as follows:47
1984

1985

UP

4.99%

4.97%

D&RG

28.39%

26.81%

Thus, the true market valve of the railroads1 rail
transportation property in Utah for the assessment years was:
1984

1985

UP

$184,630,000

$168,980,000

D&RG

$90,848,000

$85,760,000

47

The parties basically agree on these percentages. The
figures are conveniently summarized in Plaintiffs1 Supplemented
and Amended Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at
55 13, 15, 19 (UP for 1984); 20, 22, 25 (UP for 1985); 27, 29, 32
(D&RG for 1984); 33, 35, 38 (D&RG for 1985).
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The assessed value of the plaintiffs1 rail transportation
property in Utah was as follows:48
1984

1985

UP

$35,928,000

$39,760,000

L'RG

$19,305,200

$20,048,565

Thus, the ratio of assessed value to true market value was
as follows:
1984

1985

UP

19.46%

23.53%

D&RG

21.25%

23.38%

III.
THE PLAINTIFFS1 EQUALIZATION CLAIMS

The court's conclusions in part II -D of this opinion give
the left half of the equation required by the 4R Act, namely,
the ratio of assessed value to true market value of rail
transportation property within the state.

See supra note 3. The

parties have stipulated to the right half of the equation,
namely, the ratio of assessed value to true market value for all
other commercial and industrial property in the state. The
stipulation presents the court with two scenarios, depending on
whether or not the court upholds a state statutory scheme that

48

See pltffs1 exs. 391 at 4; 392 at 2; 394 at 2; and 396

at 2.
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discounts the assessed value of real property in the state an
additional twenty percent.49
Section 59-5-4.5 of the Utah Code stated:
When the county asses[s]or uses the comparable sales or
cost appraisal method in valuing taxable property for
assessment purposes, the assessor is required to
recognize that various fees, services, closing costs,
and other expenses related to the transaction lessen
the actual amount that may be received in the
transaction. The county assessor shall, therefore,
take 80% of the value based on comparable sales or cost
appraisal of the property as its reasonable fair cash
value for purposes of assessment.
Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5(1) (Supp. 1986). 50
Two county assessors testified that local assessments of
commercial and industrial real property are generally based on
49 ip^ stipulation also resolves by agreement the question
of what constitutes "all other commercial and industrial
property" in Utah for purposes of the 4R Act. The stipulation
specifies four categories of other commercial and industrial
properties—certain mining and oil and gas properties, utilities,
locally assessed personal property and locally assessed real
property. The parties have agreed on the true market value and
assessment rates for three of the four categories. See pltffs1
exs. 496 & 497. The only dispute is over the true market value
and assessment rate for locally assessed real property, and the
only disagreement between the parties there is whether or not
the court should apply the 20 percent discount statute in
determining true market value.
50

A revised version of the statute was enacted in 1987 and
is codified at section 59-2-304 of the Utah Code.
The statute further required the State Tax Commission to
"develop and implement comparable sales or cost appraisal methods
in valuing taxable property" that exclude "the various fees,
services, closing costs, and other expenses related to the sales
transaction and other intangible values." Utah Code Ann. § 59-54.5(2) (Supp. 1986). The timetable for the State Tax Commission
to develop and implement such methods has been pushed back to
January 1, 1990. See id. § 59-2-304(2) (Supp. 1988). County
assessors are required to use the methods the State Tax
Commission develops for assessments beginning January 1, 1990.
Id.
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the cost appraisal method.

£ge Tr. at 2344, 2351, 2374. 51

The

defendants therefore argue that, for purposes of the 4R Act, the
true market value of locally assessed commercial and industrial
property should be 80 percent of the appraised value, as required
by the statute.
The state's intent in passing the discount statute appears
to have been to tax real property owners only on what they might
expect to receive from a sale of their property and not on a
hypothetical gross sales price.52

That intent may be admirable.

51

The assessors also testified that, of the three
approaches commonly used, namely, the cost, income and market
comparable approaches to value, the cost approach generally
results in the highest values. See Tr. at 2343-44, 2374. The
intervenors suggest that the discount statute simply brings the
assessed values of locally assessed real property more in line
with the values of state assessed properties, which give more
weight to the income approach—in other words, that one should
discount cost indicators of value by 20 percent to get a value
that is comparable to values based on an income indicator. A
similar argument was rejected in Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Company v. Louisiana Tax Commission, 498 F. Supp. 418, 421 (M.D.
La. 1980). This court similarly finds the argument unpersuasive.
It also ignores the evidence. The evidence showed that Mr.
Prawitt gives some weight to the cost indicator of value for the
railroads. Moreover, Mr. Bexell, the Weber County Assessor,
testified that the cost approach for real property results in
values about 20 percent less than those determined under sales
assessment ratio studies, the statutorily authorized method of
valuing other commercial and industrial property under the 4R
Act. See Pub. L. No. 94-210 § 306(2)(e), 90 Stat, at 55. Yet
the state still reduces the values determined under the cost
approach by 20 percent.
52

The legislative history of the statute suggests that the
act may also have been meant to reduce the relative burden on
locally assessed taxpayers that "arose out of [a] statewide
reappraisal program, which had the effect of immediately
injecting a high degree of inflation into residential values."
Rio Alaom Corp. v. San Juan County. 681 P.2d 184, 193 (Utah
1984). The legislature apparently felt that the reappraisal
program placed an unfair burden on locally assessed properties
because "the formulae used to assess state-assessed properties
54

Moreover, the statute may pass constitutional muster.53
Nevertheless, the court concludes that applying the statute to
determine assessment ratios under the 4R Act discriminates
against the railroads by artificially increasing the ratio for
other commercial and industrial property.
The 4R Act requires a comparison between two ratios, and,
as all the experts in this case agreed, for comparisons to be
valid the items compared must be comparable.

That which is

compared under the 4R Act is "true market value." Although the
statute does not define "true market value," the experts all
basically agreed that true market value (or its various synonyms)
is the price that a willing and knowledgeable seller and a
willing and knowledgeable buyer would agree on in an arm's length
transaction.

See, e.g.. Tr. at 12 (Dr. Schoenwald's definition

of fair market value).

The fact that the seller might not net

did not tend to factor the effects of inflation into the stateassessed properties, or if they did, they did so at a much more
modest and less abrupt pace." Id. The evidence in this case
makes the legislature's assumptions suspect. Dr. Schoenwald
testified that the state's appraisal methods do factor in the
effects of inflation, and, if they do so at a much more modest
pace, it may be because inflation affects the value of rail
assets less dramatically than it affects the value of real
property. In trying to adjust taxpayers' relative burdens, the
legislature would do well to bear in mind Sir Hermann Black's
warning: "Oh what a tangled web we weave when [first] we
practice to relieve." "Sayings of the Week," Sydney Morning
Herald. July 6, 1985, quoted in A Dictionary of Legal Quotations
163 (S. James & C. Stebbings comp. 1987).
53

In the Rio Algom case, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984), the
Utah Supreme Court held that section 59-5-4.5 did not violate
article XIII of the Utah Constitution or the equal protection
provisions of either the state or federal constitutions. See 681
P.2d at 194.
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the sale price does not mean that that price is not true market
value.54
The evidence in this case was that the figures arrived at
using the comparable sales and cost appraisal methods of
valuation—before applying any discount—are considered true
market value.

See, e.g..

Tr. at 2302 (testimony of Max Arnold),

2361-62 (testimony of Steven C. Bexell); common ex. 11 (Utah
State Tax Commission Assessment Sales Ratio Study for 1984) at 2
(referring to the undiscounted values as "fair market value11).55
In arriving at the railroads1 true market value, the state relies
in part on a cost appraisal method, yet it does not reduce its
final cost indicator of value by 20 percent.

Similarly, its

stock-and-debt approach is a form of comparable sales appraisal
method, yet the state does not reduce its stock-and-debt
indicator of value by 20 percent, nor does it deduct so-called
transaction costs, such as brokerage commissions, in arriving at
its final stock-and-debt indicator of value.

Thus, if the court

is to compare true market value to true market value, it should
compare values before any adjustments for transaction costs or
other so-called intangibles are made.
In short, the court concludes that, for purposes of the 4R
54

Indeed, the parties would generally consider the
transaction costs associated with the sale in arriving at true
market value.
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The parties1 stipulation itself indicates that the "true
market value" of locally assessed real property is the value
determined by the assessment sales ratio study before the 20
percent reduction is applied. See Settlement Stipulation, §
D(3)(b)(v).
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Act, the true market value of "all other commercial and
industrial property" in the state of Utah must be determined
before the 20 percent discount statute is applied.

Cf.

Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co, v. Department of Revenue. 736
F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1984) (an across-the-board reduction in
assessed values of commercial and industrial properties under a
state statute authorizing reductions in values to reflect costs
of sale constituted discrimination in violation of the 4R Act
because it "handfed] non-selling local property owners a windfall
. . . that was not bestowed on railroads").56

This does not mean

that the state cannot continue to give the 20 percent discount to
locally assessed real property.

It simply means that, in

determining whether the state's assessments of railroads
discriminates against the railroads in violation of the 4R Act,
the court must consider the value of locally assessed real
property before the statutory discount is applied.

The state may

still be free to choose to tax real property on the basis of the
net amount the property owner could expect to receive from a sale
of his property.

But that net amount is not "true market value"

as that term is used by appraisers and in the 4R Act.
Based on the stipulation of the parties, the court finds
that the ratio of assessed value to true market value for all
56

The Eleventh Circuit left open the question of whether
the state would violate the 4R Act if, in determining the just
value of commercial and industrial property it deducted the
actual costs of sale for those properties that actually sold
during the year.
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other commercial and industrial property within the state for
assessment year 1984 was 15.4 percent and for assessment year
1985 was 16.13 percent.

IV.
CONCLUSION

Based on the court1s conclusions in part II-D and part III
of this opinion, it is clear that the state of Utah has
discriminated against the plaintiff railroads in its tax
assessments of the plaintiffs for the years 1984 and 1985 in that
it has assessed them at a higher rate than it assessed all other
commercial and industrial property within the state for the same
period.

However, the 4R Act only authorizes relief if the ratio

of assessed value to true market value for rail transportation
property exceeds the ratio for all other commercial and
industrial property "by at least 5 per centum.ff

Pub. L. No. 94-

210 § 306(2)(c), 90 Stat, at 54. The court must therefore
compare the various assessment ratios for each of the plaintiffs
and for "all other commercial and industrial property" in the
state for each assessment year to determine whether the
plaintiffs are entitled to relief.

The percentage by which UP

and the D&RG were overvalued for each of the assessment years is
as follows:
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1984

1985

UP

26%

46%

D&RG

38%

45%

Thus, the plaintiffs are entitled to relief under the 4R
Act.57
The defendants are hereby ORDERED to assess the plaintiffs
as follows:

For assessment year 1984, the defendants are ORDERED

to assess the plaintiffs based on an assessed value that is 15.4
percent of their true market value as determined by the court or
stipulated to by the parties.

For assessment year 1985, the

defendants are ORDERED to assess the plaintiffs based on an
assessed value that is 16.13 percent of their true market value
as determined by the court or stipulated to by the parties.

The

defendants are hereby ENJOINED from collecting property taxes
from the plaintiffs for assessment years 1984 and 1985 based on
assessed values that bear a greatei ratio to true market value
than 15.4 percent and 16.13 percent respectively.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

1^

day of December, 1988.
BY THE COURT

57

The state concedes that, if UP and D&RG are entitled to
equalization relief under the 4R Act, SP is entitled to relief
as well.
59

APPENDIX A
Comparison of Appraisals?-

UNION PACIFIC
1984

Schoenwald
(ex. C-30)

State
(ex. C-32)

Goodwin &
Ifflander
(ex. C-31^

Net book value
Obsolescence

5,555,803
(2,815,681)

6,205,607
(1,828,350)

6,200,299
(1,942,554)

Cost indicator

2,740,122

4,377,259

4,257,746

320,000
9.77%

356,910
8.90%

3,2'5,333
81,972
92,118

4,010,229

3,449,423

4,010,229

Cost Approach

Income Approach
Income estimate
Capitalization rate (direct cap)
Capita] ized value of income
Construction in progress
Capitalized value, operating
leases
Income indicator (direct cap)

Income estimate (NRDI + net
lease rentals)
Capitalization rate (yield cap)
Income indicator (yield cap)

1

338,643

N/A

15.40%

15.11%

2,198,981

4,577,513

All dollars are expressed in thousands. Final indicators may vary
slightly from column totals due to rounding.

stock and Debt Approach
Market value, R.R. stock
R.R. long-term debt
R.R. net current assets &
liabilities
R.R. value
Allocation factor (applied only
to stock value by G&I)
Market value, R.R. operating
property
Leased equipment

3,074,843
1,491,073
(115,622)

3,000,000
1,414,415

4,450,294
83.98%

4,414,415
89.39%

3,737,350

4,096,115

106,017

34,246

Stock and debt indicator

3,843,367

4,130,361

4,377,259
3,449,423

Total value, parent's stock &
debt
Total value, non-railroad & nanoperating property
Stock and debt indicator

10,549,892
(7,531,760)
3,018,132

Correlated Values
Cost indicator
Income indicator (direct cap)
Income indicator (yield cap)
Stock and debt indicator

2,740,122
2,198,981
3,018,132

3,843,367

4,257,746
4,010,229
4,577,513
4,130,361

Correlated market value

2,608,557

3,700,000

4,100,000
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UNICN PACIFIC
1985

Schoenwald
(ex. 0-33)

State
(ex. C-351

Goodwin &
Ifflander
(ex. 0-34)

Net book value
Obsolescence

5,671,608
(3,187,444)

6,475,611
(2,076,376)

6,467,163
(2,661,884)

Cost indicator

2,484,164

4,399,234

3,805,279

310,000
11.98%

366,887
10.30%

2,587,646
85,752
87,113

3,562,010

2,760,511

3,562,010

Market value, R.R. stock
R.R. long-term debt
R.R. net current assets &
liabilities
R.R. value
Allocation factor (applied only
to stock value by G&I)
Market value, R.R. operating
property
Leased equipment

2,674,843
1,427,374
32,454

2,600,000
1,322,267

4,134,671
81.77%

3,922,267
86.69%

3,380,866

3,567,207

93,256

28,640

Stock and debt indicator

3,474,122

3,604,847

Cost Approadi

Income Approach
Income estimate
Capitalization rate (direct cap)
Capitalized value of income
Construction in progress
Capitalized value, operating
leases
Income indicator (direct cap)

Income estimate (NRDI + net
lease rentals)
Capitalization rate (yield cap)
Inccxne indicator (yield cap)

310,815
16.00%
1,942,594

Stock and Debt Approach
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Total value, parent's stock &
debt
Total value, non-railroad & nonoperating property
Stock and debt indicator

8,881,003
(6,290,824)
2,590,179

Oorrelated Values
Cost indicator
Incxme indicator (direct cap)
Income indicator (yield cap)
Stock and debt indicator
Oorrelated market value

2,484,164

4,399,234
2,760,511

3,805,279
3,562,011

1,942,594
2,590,179

3,474,122

3,604,847

2,266,387

3,400,000

3,600,000
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EENVER & RIO GRANDE
1984

Schoenwald
(ex. C-36)

State
fex. C-38)

Goodwin &
Ifflander
(ex. C-37)

Net book value
Obsolescence

467,739
(286,022)

541,000
(197,962)

537,697
(207,282)

Cost indicator

181,717

343,039

330,415

23,000
8.28%

25,851
8.30%

277,778
8,163
5,954

311,453

291,894

311,453

Cost Approach

Income Approach
Income estimate
Capitalization rate (direct cap)
Capitalized value of income
Construction in progress
Capitalized value, operating
leases
Income indicator (direct cap)

Income estimate (NROI + net
lease rentals)
Capitalization rate (yield cap)
Income indicator (yield cap)

25,183
15.40%
163,526

Stock and Debt Approach
Market value, R.R. stock
R.R. long-term debt
R.R. net current assets &
liabilities
R.R. value
Allocation factor (applied only
to stock value by G&I)
Market value, R.R. operating
property
Teased equipment

350,000
87,657
(5,025)

300,000
75,757

432,632
81.87%

375,757
89.43%

354,187

344,047

8,946

6,771

Stock and debt indicator

363,133

350,817
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Itatal value, parents stock &
debt
Total value, non-railroad & noncperating property
Stock and debt indicator

677,366
(331,531)
345,835

Correlated Values
Cost indicator
Income indicator (direct cap)
Inocroe indicator (yield cap)
Stock and debt indicator

181,717

343,039
291,894

330,415
311,453

163,526
345,835

363,133

350,817

Correlated market value

254,681

320,000

330,000

DENVER & RIO GRANDE
1985

State
(eye. 0-41)

Goodwin &
Ifflander
(ex. 0-40)

Net book value
Obsolescence

598,509
(159f082)

585,883
(198,380)

Cost indicator

439,428

387,503

27,000
11.00%

30,727
10.10%

245,455
1,582
5,038

304,232

252,075

304,232

Schoenwald
(ex, C-39)
Cost Approach

Income Approach
Income estimate
Capitalization rate (direct cap)
Capitalized value of inccme
Construction in progress
Capitalized value, operating
leaf
Inccroe indicator (direct cap)

Inccroe estimate (NRDI + net
lease rentals)
Capital izaticxi rate (yield cap)
Inccroe indicator (yield cap)

Stock and Debt Approach
Market value, R.R. stock
R.R. long-term debt
R.R. net current assets &
liabilities
R.R. value
Allocation factor (applied only
to stock value by G&I)
Market value, R.R. operating
property
Leased equipment

350,000
79,394
13,999

275,000
82,405

443,393
87.67%

357,405
93.22%

388,729

338,760

6,181

8,132

Stock and debt indicator

394,910

346,892
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Total value, parent's stock &
debt
Total value, non-railroad & nonoperating property
Stock and debt indicator

491,129
(212,393)
278,736

Correlated Values
Cost indicator
Incone indicator (direct cap)
Income indicator (yield cap)
Stock and debt indicator
Correlated market value

439,428
252,075

387,503
304,232

278,736

394,910

346,892

278,7362

320,000

325,000

2

Dr. Schoenwald's appraisal of D&BG for assessment year 1985 is based
solely on his analysis of the purchase of Rio Grande Industries, Inc., by the
Anschutz Corporation in the fall of 1984.

67

